INDIA

A Record and Review of Indian Affairs

PUBLISHED MONTHLY

EDITED BY GORDON HEWART.

ENTERED AT STATIONERS' HALL.] [OFFICES: 84 AND 85, PALACE CHAMBERS, LONDON, S.W.

VOL. VII., No. 8. (NEW SERIES.) AUGUST, 1896. Subscription, Post Free, SIX SHILLINGS PER ANN. IN INDIA, SIX RUPEES.

CONTENTS:

	PAGE.
Indiana: Notes on Indian Affairs	225
The Indian Troops at Suakin:	
I.—The Proposed Court of Arbitration by Sir W. Wedderburn, M.P.	231
II.—Injustice to India, by J. Dacosta	233
Swâmi Vivekanânda in London	235
K. S. Ranjitsinhji	237
Our London Letter..	238
Lord Welby's Commission	240
"A Masterpiece of Melancholy Meanness"	241
Natural Law in the Political World	243
Indian Troops at Suakin:	
I.—The Debate in the Commons	245
II.—In the Lords	246
III.—Summary of Parliamentary Papers	247
IV.—Opinions of the Press	254
Bibliography of Books and Articles on Indian Subjects..	240
Recent Official Publications	240

Indiana.

The Borrowed Troops.

THE final decision of the Cabinet to charge upon the Indian revenues the ordinary expenses of the Indian force despatched to Suakin seems to lend colour to the theory that the debate in the House of Commons was postponed from June 4th to July 6th not so much in deference to the request of the Government of India as because discussion would have been inconvenient to the Cabinet at the earlier date. In the present number of INDIA some attempt is made to come to terms with the large mass of material which the discussion has produced. On another page will be found signed articles by Sir W. Wedderburn, M.P., and Mr. J. Dacosta upon particular issues raised in the debates in both Houses, while in our editorial columns and "Our London Letter" respectively we deal with the larger questions and the minor incidents of a controversy that promises to render impossible in the future a repetition of the shabby transaction out of which it arose. Elsewhere we print descriptions of the scenes in both Houses of Parliament by an eye-witness, a critical analysis of the Parliamentary papers issued in anticipation of the debates, and a series of typical extracts intended to convey to Indian readers some slight idea of the truly remarkable volume of considered rebuke which has assailed the Government's unhandsome policy from the press of all parties, and in all quarters of the country.

The Indian Budget.

The Indian Budget is, at the time of writing, expected to come on for discussion in the House of Commons on some day in the second week of August. On July 16th Sir W. Wedderburn put questions to Mr. Balfour in the House of Commons for the purpose of obtaining some sort of undertaking that the whole of the discussion should not be rushed through in a single sitting. Mr. Balfour's answer was evasive. He could not hold out any hope of being able to give more time than had been given in previous years. But during recent years, at any rate, two days have been granted—one for the general debate on the motion for going into committee, the other for discussion of the Budget itself. The crop of questions which call for notice this year is certainly not less than usual. Apart from the general scope and contents of the Financial Statement—which, since April last, has not ceased to receive attention in our columns—there are at least two questions of prime importance which may be expected to provoke discussion, namely, the occupation of Chitral and the re-arrangement of the cotton duties. Sir Henry Fowler, in the remarkable

speech which he delivered on Sir W. Wedderburn's motion for the adjournment of the House, suggested that he was waiting for the debate on the Indian Budget to discuss the latter question. On both questions, as it happens, his policy has been reversed by his successor. Sir W. Wedderburn recalled Sir H. Fowler's statement to Mr. Balfour, but Mr. Balfour, whose indifference to Parliamentary proceedings is passing into a byword, had not heard of it. The way in which the Indian Budget is, at the best of times, hurried through the House of Commons is discreditable enough; but if only one day is allowed this year, and Sir Henry Fowler delivers a voluminous speech on the cotton duties, it is obvious that there will be time for little else except Lord George Hamilton's official statement. It is the duty of the Government to prevent this stifling of discussion—a duty which the withdrawal of the Education Bill ought to have rendered comparatively easy.

The Jhalawar Case.

The deposition of the Mahárájá of Jhalawar by the Government of India, without any enquiry by an impartial tribunal or any possibility of appeal, has led, as it was bound to do, to a debate in the House of Commons. Lord G. Hamilton and some of the Irish members alike deprecated Mr. Herbert Roberts's motion for the adjournment on July 21st, though on different grounds. The occasion was, of course, inopportune in the judgment of the Secretary of State, but as the criticism would have been applied to any other occasion by a critic who is singularly ready to defend the bureaucratic acts of the Government of India, though he is not so ready to accede to its just requests, Lord G. Hamilton's remonstrances do not call for serious notice. Many of the Irish members, however, whose generous aid to the Indian reform party we have often had the pleasure of acknowledging, were disposed to look with hostility upon a motion which seemed to threaten the progress of the Irish Land Bill. We make no doubt that the objectors would now admit that the excellence of some portions of the Irish Land Bill is no answer to the deposed Mahárájá's claim for justice. Lord George Hamilton went out of his way with so little tact to labour the annoyance of the Irishmen that they must have perceived his purpose, and are not likely, at his implied invitation, to cease to take friendly notice of Indian questions. The moral pointed by the Jhalawar case is as simple as it is grave. The British Government simply cannot afford to create among the loyal Princes and Chiefs of the Native States the impression that their rights may be capriciously destroyed and that, if allegations are brought against them, they may be condemned unheard. The refusal of the Government of India to submit its case against the Mahárájá of Jhalawar to an impartial tribunal is strange in exact proportion to the Government's belief in the justice of what it has done. If the Mahárájá has been rightly deposed, why should the Government shun enquiry? If enquiry cannot safely be faced, why is not the Mahárájá restored? In no matter does it behove the Government of India to walk more circumspectly than in its dealings with Native States, and in no case are the advantages of an impartial tribunal more obvious or more substantial than in a case between a Native Prince and a Political Agent. Those who read the Blue-book may be moved to reflect upon the duties of this important officer. One would think that his first duty was to guide and help a young Prince, and to regard his shortcomings as, in some sort, a discredit to his responsible adviser.

"Moral and Material Progress."

On the face of the annual "Statement of the Moral and Material Progress and Condition of India" all is well. Indeed, there is hardly a single department of national activity where the official eye fails to discern signs of improvement. Where the figures happen to go the wrong way, they still manage somehow to set off the superior rectitude of the figures that go the right way. The difficulty is to know the true significance of the masses of statistics, whether by the help of the official gloss or in spite of it. The record of legislation, viceregal or provincial, is extremely modest. The most important general Acts were, of course, those dealing with the cotton duties. In Bengal and in the North-West Provinces and Oudh some amendment and expansion of municipal Acts was accomplished; in Bombay a territorial extension was given to certain laws; but not a single Act from Madras received the assent of the Governor-General. The energy of the legislators appears to have been directed elsewhere. The main point, no doubt, is quality; but the tale of legislative achievement would hardly seem to keep pace with the development of the needs of the country and with advancing opinion. Meantime, it is gratifying to find that, although there has been no enlargement of municipal authority, nor any increase in the number of municipalities, the general municipal results of the year still gain a very decent official approval. "The conduct of business by the municipal committees was, in the majority of cases, considered by the governments of the various provinces to be satisfactory." The approval is subject to a certain qualification, indeed—a qualification well worth signalising with emphasis, although it might easily be paralleled in places where municipal government

has been in operation for centuries. "The interest taken in municipal matters by the electors," we are told, "was far from keen." This lack of serious interest in home matters necessarily tells on the argument for a more general application of the principle of Home Rule, and we should be glad to see it reformed away. At the same time, "measures for the improvement of the water supply, which is still very deficient over India, were taken or sanctioned during the year in each province, and many important drainage works were proceeded with." There is life in the system, clearly; but the official criticism ought to prompt the electors to strike its roots deeper, and to show to all men, beyond cavil, that they are in real earnest about the principle involved.

Sanitation and Agriculture.

IN most of the provinces, substantial advances are reported in the much-needed work of sanitation. It is worth remarking that the Mahárani Surnamoyi, C.I., had the generosity to undertake to defray the estimated cost of a scheme for the water supply of Berhampore—an example that ought to be fruitful, not merely for similar contributions, but for impressing on the Indian mind the importance of sanitary works. The European troops had a bad year. Enteric fever was the cause of 36 per cent. of the deaths; venereal diseases and ague of 34 and 27 per cent. of the hospital cases. No fewer than 1,808 men, or 25·43 per 1,000 of strength, were invalided, 39 per cent. of them being discharged as unfit for further service. India is evidently no place for raw recruits, and even men over 25 need a great deal of acclimatising; yet 60 per cent. of the invalided were under 25, and 81 per cent. of the total strength had seen less than five years' service. There is a problem of economy here, apparently. The comparison of the death-rate from enteric fever among the Native troops with that of the European troops —0·05 with 5·75 per 1,000—suggests a drastic investigation of the different conditions of physique and habit of the two classes. Among the general population, the death-rate for all the provinces rose from 25·75 per 1,000 in 1893 to 33·98; and in the North-West Provinces and Oudh, the figure went as high as 42·51. Fever was the great enemy. The supreme importance of sanitation was very painfully vindicated. How did it stand with agriculture? The statistics are not so complete as could be wished, more than one-ninth of the whole area of India being, for some inscrutable reason, still outside the figures returned. The wheat harvest varied greatly in different provinces, while the area cultivated with wheat was a little over the normal of recent years, though less than in 1893-94. In the last ten years the export has gone down very materially, notwithstanding the spurt of 1891-92 in response to the dearth in Eastern Europe. The figure for 1894-95 is little more than half that for the preceding year, and it is less than one-third of 1885-86. The reasons offered are the abundance of America, and of Argentina especially, and the low prices in Europe; but it is said that a marked recovery set in early in 1895-96. The important oil seeds crop was considerably—almost one-third—under the normal, owing to the ravages of excessive moisture and blight. Still the export was largely over that of any former year, except the year immediately preceding. The rice harvest, on the other hand, "gave a bumper yield in Bengal," where close upon two-thirds of the normal rice area lies. The export, though comparatively small, was 36 per cent. over the preceding years. "Two-thirds of the exports went from Burma; more than half the exports were sent to Europe, and most of the remainder to Ceylon and Further Asia." The treasury netted almost the record duty on rice exports. The cotton area contracted somewhat, but still it kept above the normal; the season, however, was unfavourable, through heavy or untimely rains, and the yield was much below the average everywhere, and considerably below the previous year. The exports of raw cotton show much variation during the past decade, and last year the figure was unprecedently low. Tea is looking up, and the export is steadily rising. The United Kingdom is India's best customer for tea. The variations of taste in the past generation are curious. In 1865 we took 93 per cent. of our imported tea from China, and only 2 per cent. from India. In 1885 we took only 66 per cent. from China, but 30 per cent. from India, and 2 per cent. from Ceylon, which now comes into the account. The percentages have almost steadily gone forward in the same direction, and in 1895, while China's contribution has fallen to 16 per cent., India's has advanced to 46 per cent., and Ceylon's to 32 per cent. At the same time, the average import price of China tea is 8·6d. per lb., while Indian and Ceylon tea fetch an average price of 10d. per lb. There can be no doubt, however, that, if the mind of the Government could be given more freely to the general conditions of agriculture, there ought to be immense advances in all the forms of production.

A Record of Exhaustion.

THE railways furnish the largest figures to the budget of public works. The total expenditure of Rx. 23,592,649 exceeded the total revenue by Rx. 2,348,489. Much of the mileage has been laid down primarily for strategic purposes, and is not expected to pay in direct returns. This is especially the case on the Punjab side. Everywhere a railway fosters development, and opens up a way for ideas to

penetrate; and it is one of the best forms of famine insurance. But, after all, the question comes round to the point, How far can India afford it? A large part of the material has to be paid in gold, and it is only an insignificant fraction of the dividends that finds its way into Indian pockets. The railway problem calls for an attention it cannot possibly receive while the directing minds of the country are squabbling on the frontiers. Nor is the irrigation system free from elements of anxiety. "The immense systems of large artificial water channels, with which some parts of India are covered, would appear at first sight to offer unrivalled opportunities for water carriage." Undoubtedly. "But though efforts have been made to organise navigation services on the larger irrigation canals, it cannot be said that, on the whole, they have met with a large measure of success. In many cases, the receipts from the traffic have failed to cover the working expenses." The unsuitability of alignment and level for navigation can hardly be the sole, or the main, reason; and one would like to know the nature and extent of the said efforts of organisation. Still, the object of irrigation works is to irrigate; and, on this, the main point of the business, we are told that "there are great differences in the financial success of the irrigation works in the various provinces." On the whole, however, the percentage of net receipts on capital outlay for 1894-95 is set down at 4·3—a figure fractionally less than those of the two previous years. The "minor" works are more successful financially than the "major," which are handicapped by large initial outlay. The movements of trade have a special Parliamentary paper to themselves, and are merely outlined here. The disturbance caused by the closing of the mints and the re-imposition of import duties in 1893-94, and by the re-imposition of the cotton duties, with the countervailing excise, in December 1894, left its mark. "Among the decreases of imports that in metals and hardware was the most notable; yet the duty on iron and steel, the imports of which fell 13 per cent., was only one per cent. *ad valorem*"—a sufficiently good illustration of the sensitiveness of the market. "There were large increases in the exports of rice, jute goods, and considerable increases under most other staples, so that the gross value of merchandise exports, exclusive of re-exports, was 103¾ millions against 102 millions in the preceding year, and was higher than it had ever been before, notwithstanding the great decline in the exports of raw cotton and wheat." The net excess of exports over imports of merchandise, Government transactions, and treasure, is given at Rx. 33,352,642—an extremely large figure. What does it mean but a serious draining of the country? "In the trade of every country with the rest of the world," says Professor Thorold Rogers, "if the community is doing well, the imports are always in excess of exports, when interpreted in money value or prices." If the community is doing well! How, then, is India doing, on this official statement? And the tale is the same year by year, with variation only in the figures of the adverse balance. The figures given from 1890-91 to 1893-94 are Rx. 9,057,843, Rx. 27,123,285, Rx. 29,978,613, Rx. 14,467,943—a continuous record of exhaustion.

The Plague of Militarism. The deplorable position of the finances, with the true causes of depletion, has been fully exposed and commented on in these columns. Land Revenue, Forest, and Registration are the only heads of revenue that show a decrease. The Land Revenue, in spite of official exertions, went down Rx. 206,128. "On the whole," we are told, "the tendency of the land revenue is to increase gradually and slowly:" in the past generation it has been increasing at the rate of about a million every five years. But this increase is partly due to territorial extension, as in the case of Upper Burma; and there is an ominous lack of elasticity in this, by far the most important, source of revenue. In Bengal, there were in the year under notice 1,466 sales of land for arrears, the estates being mostly small and of little value. The relations of landlord and tenant were "strained in particular localities, owing to the levy of illegal cesses by landholders, the illegal enhancement of rents, no-rent combinations among tenants, exorbitant exactions by landholders," and so forth. The Bengal Tenancy Act "continues to work smoothly;" but the number of suits under the Rent Tenancy Law has gone up to 238,399, a strong and steady increase. In the North-West Provinces, the coercive processes rose from 71,000 to 75,000; the attachments of property for arrears, from 7,016 to 9,642, though the sales of defaulters' property went down from 354 to 336. "The number of suits and applications under the rent law was 271,592, or 3 per cent. above the total of 1892-93, and was larger than in any previous year. Of the suits, over 90 per cent. were, as in previous years, for arrears of rent." Similar statements are made in respect of the other provinces—except Madras, whose figures have attained a special interest. The euphemistic "coercive process," we may note, was in special request in fertile Berar. There, we learn, "the number of coercive processes issued against defaulters showed an increase, there having issued 15,638 writs of demand against 10,324 in the previous year; in 46 cases, personal property was sold for arrears; 298 fields were also sold; but no defaulters were sent to prison." An increase of over 50 per cent. is, indeed, an increase! And this in fertile Berar! We are

sick of customs and excise, as well as of the salt tax. The impression remains that, in spite of the large figures and the multifarious business recorded in this Blue-book, the community is *not* doing well—not anything like so well as it might do. The sources of hindrance and mischief are hidden away under a smooth and smiling surface of cheerful figures. It is alike useless to ban or to entreat. But the first step towards a satisfactory administration is the abandonment of military enterprise, and the release of the official energies for internal oversight and direction.

The Cotton Duties.

THE proposals laid before the Legislative Council by the millowners of Bombay and Calcutta with regard to the cotton duties were rejected, according to the statement of the Viceroy, mainly because they lacked "some reasonable chance of finality." But it must not be assumed that the arrangements actually made by the Government of India are regarded even by their authors as final. For the Viceroy himself found it "impossible to give the honourable member (Mr. Playfair) the pledge he asks"; Mr. Playfair having requested some assurance that the measures of the Government would ensure finality. This admission makes it impossible silently to acquiesce in the existing state of affairs, even though Lord George Hamilton be backed by a Ministerial majority which, in the debate on the payment of Indian troops despatched to Suakin, has proved its capacity for voting against its convictions at the bidding of its leader. The printed return of the protest recorded in the Minutes of the India Council by Sir James Peile and Sir Alexander Arbuthnot against the despatch of April 2nd, together with the answer of Lord George Hamilton, adds little material to the discussion which has been carried on in these columns. But it throws some light on the methods by which the present Government is in the habit of attaining its ends, and it is valuable as the record of an official and expert criticism of the crudities of Lord George Hamilton's direction of affairs. The Secretary of State, in his reply, lays great stress on what he regards as the self-evident fairness and equity of his decision. He appears to be sincerely enamoured of the uniformity of his 3½ per cent on all mill-made cloth, which was his answer to the problem how "to put the two great competing industries on terms of perfect equality." Either he is a master of the art of self-deception, or he is less candid than might be desired. No other hypothesis can explain his re-assertion of belief in the justice of the famous despatch. No doubt, as Sir James Peile points out, the formula, "tax all cloth and free all yarn," looks eminently plausible. But examined in the light of the previous enactment it amounts simply to this:—tax Indian cloth, which was hitherto untaxed, and free Lancashire yarn, for Indian yarn was already free. Not even an appeal to the sacred name of Free Trade can be held to justify a tax which competent opinion unanimously pronounces iniquitous, while even the frequent invocations of that doctrine display glaring inconsistencies. Did not the Secretary of State record in writing on May 5th his conviction that the 3½ per cent. duty on mill-woven goods would not enable hand looms to compete successfully with power mills? Why, then, does he endeavour to make a point on April 16th by declaring, "Moreover, the hand looms compete not merely with the Indian mills, but also with the Lancashire mills"? Either the duty is protective or it is not. If it is protective, what becomes of Lord George Hamilton's unswerving championship of economic truth, his sole ostensible reason for the re-arrangement of the tax? If it is not protective, then there can be no possible reason for the reduction from 5 to 3½ per cent, and the increased incidence of the tax. As a matter of fact, the Government of India knock the bottom out of their own position by tacitly admitting the objection. Sir James Westland said, "Manchester may justly object to being prevented from trying the experiment [of exporting coarse counts to India] by our insisting on interposing in the way of it a duty to which we do not subject the goods of Indian manufacture." Lord George Hamilton wrote on May 5th, "The possible competition of mills in native States cannot at present be a serious factor in the problem." The upshot of the whole matter is that Lancashire must be guarded against any possibility of protective interference either in the present or in the future. Indian manufactures must wait for satisfaction until the grievance becomes a pressing evil. Perhaps those who know the methods of the Indian Government would assign an even longer term.

The Burden on India.

THE interests of the mass of Indian consumers have been subordinated to the demands of Lancashire, and no argument is too paltry, no fallacy too obvious, to be called into requisition to bolster up the injustice. Lancashire objects to the remission of the tax on coarser counts, because she anticipates in consequence an increased demand for those counts and less demand for the higher counts which she supplies. The Secretary of State declares the remission futile, because as the higher counts rise in price through the imposition of the duties the lower counts rise in sympathy with them. Sir J. Westland shows that the increase caused by the tax would be microscopic—less than a halfpenny per head per annum on all consumers. To reconcile such argu-

ments as these is beyond the power of the human intellect. An infinitesimal rise in price cannot possibly produce the dislocation which is prophesied by the Manchester interest. And if a general rise in price is certain to take place whether the lower counts are exempt or not, then there was no reason for extending the tax so as to include those counts, on the pretext of a probable dislocation. If Lord George Hamilton's statement represents the opinion of the Government, India might still have been allowed to have her own way in a matter which on his own showing was indifferent. Yet with famine threatening in the North-West, with increased expenditure on account of Chitral, with trouble looming in Thibet, plans brewing at Simla with Herat as their objective, and money required for mobilisation with heaven knows what object, the Government had the audacity to take advantage of a sudden rise in the rupee and some other equally fortuitous increases of income, and to present the consumers or manufacturers of Lancashire goods with 50 lakhs of rupees. Mr. Playfair estimated the reduction, under the rearrangement, of duty on Lancashire goods at 51½ lakhs, or 37 per cent. The increase of duty on Indian goods by the inclusion of all cloth under the 3½ per cent. excise was 11 lakhs, or 300 per cent Yet after the statements and calculations put forward by Sir James Westland with a view to minimising the restrictive tendencies of the 3½ per cent. impost on trade, we are expected to believe that the reduction of 1½ per cent. is a real boon to Lancashire. In one respect, no doubt, it was a great concession in the eyes of the Manchester party, coupled as it was with the extension of the excise. Pecuniarily it can have conferred little, if any, benefit on English cotton manufacturers. But it certainly did gratify a trade jealousy. As a sop to Cerberus it has been endowed with soothing powers out of all proportion to its real importance. On the other side, the addition of 11 lakhs to the burden of India has equally an importance in no way commensurate with its mere pecuniary value. In the first place, it must inevitably fall on the very poorest class of the community, those who live always on the verge of starvation. Secondly, it increases, as has been stated, at the enormous rate of 300 per cent. the contributions levied on Indian cotton manufactures under the previous regulations. Thirdly, it falls short by 40 lakhs of the sum remitted by the reduction of the duties from 5 to 3½ per cent., and herein leaves the Indian taxpayer ample ground for complaint. No one denies that India is taxed to the utmost limit of her capacity. Yet when the Government found itself enriched by a series of windfalls with that rarest of blessings in India—a surplus—it could devise no better means of employing its surplus than to present 50 lakhs to the classes best able to pay, and to spend 50 lakhs on mobilisation, while it extorted a paltry 11 lakhs from the peasant in order to gratify the cotton lords of Manchester.

"Hole-and-Corner" Legislation.

No doubt 11 lakhs is in itself a comparatively insignificant sum. It is equally true that the thirty or forty thousand sterling which India is to be called upon to pay to the troops at Suakin is a mere drop in the sea compared with the huge sum dealt with every year in the Indian Budget. But it is the last straw that breaks the camel's back, and there are only too manifest signs to show that the loyalty of India is being tested within dangerously short range of the breaking strain. The very excellent theory on which the Government of India is supposed to work is that England governs India for the benefit of the Indians. As Professor Murison pertinently enquires, would any self-governing colony be likely to submit to the treatment meted out to India on the cotton question? Money is urgently needed for the development of the country, and every rupee that can be spared should be devoted to that end, instead of being thrown away on mobilisation for future military insanity on the frontiers, or presented to the comparatively well-to-do classes. Even were the necessity not so urgent, or the addition of even a trifling burden to the overtaxed rayat a matter of life and death to him, yet the imposition of a tax which is felt to be unnecessary, even as things are, unjust, and due only to the military extravagance of the Indian Government, could not fail to produce extreme discontent. "The people of India," wrote an Anglo-Indian correspondent to Sir John Leng, "who pay the taxes have the first claim to decide how the taxes shall be levied and what those taxes shall be. The British Parliament has been until very recently regarded by the people of India as their last resort in search of equity and justice." Since those words were written the Government has decided in the face of public opinion to exact the iniquitous charge for pay of the troops at Suakin. This most unfortunate decision can only foster the already widespread feeling that India is really governed in the interests of England. Lord George Hamilton's remark on economic forces is equally true of moral forces. They are "dynamic, not stationary, and a small percentage of duty often creates a disturbance and revolution out of all proportion to the weight or amount of the duty imposed" if it violates a nation's sense of equity. Moreover, the device by which the despatch of April evaded the fair criticism of the India Council is not less an insult to that body and to British traditions than to India. The intentions of the Home Government were conveyed in a draft of a private telegram

to the Governor-General from the Secretary of State, which was read to the Council, but not offered for discussion, at a purely formal meeting held in order to comply with the statute under which the Council sits, and from which Sir Alexander Arbuthnot was absent. Sir James Peile dissented from the proposed measures, but his unsupported objection was overruled, and the readjustment was shortly afterwards assented to without further discussion. Sir Alexander Arbuthnot has been assured that this piece of "hole-and-corner" legislation was an accident. It was a very deplorable accident. Unhappily it squares only too truly with other high-handed proceedings on the part of the present Ministry. The leading members of the Cabinet, it is said, avoid newspapers for fear of disturbing their mental balance and warping their decisions. In other words, they prefer to admit the purely bureaucratic view of affairs, untempered by contact with public opinion. The theory may not be a true one, but it fulfils at any rate one requirement of a true theory—it explains the facts. The tyranny of the Cabinet has become steadily more evident during the last twelve months, and in nothing more evident than in Indian affairs. Having determined on any course of action, however unpopular, it overpowers opposition by declaring that the division on the point at issue involves a vote of confidence. There are unmistakable signs that its long-suffering supporters are weary of voting against their consciences and are breaking away. England is growing disgusted with bureaucracy, and there is every reason to hope that her brief and disagreeable experience of "the "strongest government of modern times" may awaken sympathy with the long-suffering taxpayers of India.

THE INDIAN TROOPS AT SUAKIN.

I.—THE PROPOSED COURT OF ARBITRATION.

By Sir W. Wedderburn, Bart., M.P.

A debate upon India in the House of Lords is always interesting, and important; because, whether the decision be wise or unwise, we get in such a debate the views of the men who have held high office as regards Indian affairs: Secretaries of State, Viceroys, Governors, and Commanders-in-Chief. What comes out on such an occasion is all to the good of India. For everything that is said in favor of class prejudice, race ascendancy, or obscurantism, is put down to the natural proclivities of a privileged assembly, and attracts little attention; while any declarations which make for equal justice and magnanimity, whether coming from the Government or the Opposition, remain as a valuable legacy, a store-house of authoritative opinion, for the benefit of India in times to come.

In the case of the Suakin debate we have been more than usually fortunate. For although, no doubt, the majority acted according to their natural instincts, and voted for the Tory Government, irrespective of the merits of the particular case, we have on the other hand secured a clear declaration in favour of reciprocity; and, still more important, we gain this advantage that a distinct proposal has been put forward having for its object to insure to India in practice equal justice in matters of finance. This proposal, to establish an arbitration tribunal between India and Great Britain, in order to settle disputes regarding the apportionment of charges between the two Countries, was first brought into prominence by Mr. Arthur Balfour in the debate on Suakin in the House of Commons. He then asked "whether the time has not arrived when we might with advantage, both to India and to England, constitute some kind of tribunal of arbitration . . . for the determination of questions of this sort, in which the interests of India and Great Britain should be alike and equally represented." This general suggestion was brought into the sphere of practical politics by Lord Salisbury when, in the House of Lords, he stated that early in the year he was "so impressed in favour of such a course that he laid before his colleagues a proposal for the appointment of a tribunal, which should be so impartially composed as to obtain the confidence of the taxpayers of both England and India." When, however, they came to consider the details, they felt that it would be best to await the report of the Royal Commission on Indian expenditure. And Lord Salisbury expressed a hope that that Commission "will furnish suggestions for regulations to which the Government of the day may be able to conform without any fear that the steps which they may think necessary for the defence of the Empire will be made the subject of discussions which may be injurious to the interests of that Empire." From the above it appears that, in the mind of the Prime Minister at least, the scheme for a tribunal has taken a tolerably concrete form. The idea was also approved by Lord Northbrook, who thought that a promise by Government to constitute such an authority would entirely counteract the ill-feeling raised in India by the miserable Suakin business; while Lord Lansdowne considered that some machinery might be devised which would enable her Majesty's Government and the Indian Government so to apply the principles of reciprocity that India would be placed for the future "in an infinitely sounder position with regard to these controversies than she had ever before occupied."

This sounds a good and benevolent offer. Ought

we to look such a gift horse in the mouth? Is it our painful duty to regard with suspicion this gracious offer, because it comes from the hand of a Tory Government? I am not quite sure. But reading the whole of Lord Salisbury's speech there is one point which necessarily arouses suspicion, and that is his frankly expressed dislike of parliamentary discussion. Can it be true that his main object is to withdraw these financial questions from under the control of Parliament? Certainly in discussing the inconvenience of existing arrangements he lays more stress on the disagreeables arising from parliamentary debate than upon the danger of injustice to the weaker party, and he puts himself forward as the champion of the British rather than of the Indian taxpayer. This is what he says: "There is nothing which has occurred in the course of the debate with which I more sympathize than the regret which has been expressed that this matter should have been made the subject of parliamentary discussion and of party sophistry and ingenuity. It appears likely that such a discussion may do some little harm. It is not a very admirable thing—and indeed there is something rather squalid in the fact—that there should be a contest between two parts of the Empire as to what share each should bear in the expense in its defence. Moreover such a discussion must lead to the inevitable injury which, as the noble earl opposite has pointed out, must result from disclosing departmental communications which are not always couched in a judicial tone." And he concludes by saying that "we must try to adopt some way by which these discussions may be avoided in the future." This important declaration indicates the possibility of a very serious danger. Does it refer to an intention of tampering with the provisions of Sec. 55 of the Government of India Act of 1858? Let us recall the wording of that section. It provides that "except for preventing or repelling actual invasion of her Majesty's Indian possessions, or under other sudden or urgent necessity, the revenues of India shall not, *without the consent of both Houses of Parliament*, be applicable to defray the expenses of any military operation carried on beyond the external frontiers of such possessions by her Majesty's forces charged upon such revenues." Is it intended to avoid these discussions in the future by altering this section and by doing away with the necessity of obtaining the consent of both Houses of Parliament? I most sincerely trust that there is no such idea. Also we are at liberty to hope that the desired result may be sought by a different process, which will be both legitimate and creditable. Lord Salisbury has called the discussion "squalid." But the discussion is only squalid in so far as it is an attempt to justify the meanness of placing an unfair burden upon the weaker party. Such an objectionable discussion may be effectually avoided in either of two ways; (*a*) by constituting such an impartial and effective tribunal to enquire into the merits of each case that the recommendations submitted by it to both Houses of Parliament will carry with them their own justification, or (*b*) by abrogating the provisions of section 55, and burking parliamentary discussion altogether. As either of these alternatives will attain the desired object I see no reason why Lord Salisbury should not choose the better part. I shall always remember that it was by his act, when Secretary of State for India, that Mysore was restored to its Native rulers, with such happy results; and I shall cherish the hope that in the present case he will act in a just and constitutional direction. It is also to be noted that in his speech he referred approvingly to Lord Kimberley's views, and Lord Kimberley pointed out that Parliament was the authority which must be the ultimate judge in such matters: "the ultimate decision . . . . could not be removed from the Government and the Parliament of this country. It was a question of discretion in the application of a principle from which we could not swerve. The Imperial power was here, and it must remain here."

Assuming that this more favourable view of the intentions of the Government is the correct one, the next point to consider is how such a tribunal shall be found as, in the words of Lord Salisbury, will "obtain the confidence of the taxpayers of both England and India"? It is in such cases generally better if possible to utilize an existing machinery, especially if that machinery is one of proved efficiency and accepted authority, rather than to constitute a new tribunal. And on behalf of the taxpayers of India I think I may say there is no authority in England which more commands the confidence of the Indian public as regards wisdom and strict impartiality, than the Judicial Committee of her Majesty's Privy Council. Fortunately, the Statute 3 and 4 William IV., c. 41, which defines the functions of the Judicial Committee, not only provides that it shall hear judicial appeals, under section 3, but also under section 4, authorises it to entertain any other matter whatsoever upon a special reference by the Crown. Section 4 runs as follows: "That it shall be lawful for his Majesty to refer to the said Judicial Committee, for hearing or consideration, any such other matters whatsoever, as his Majesty shall think fit; and such Committee shall thereupon hear and consider the same." And Lord Justice Knight Bruce, in the case of the Nawab of Surat (Moore's Appeals, vol. v, p. 499) observed with reference to these very wide powers, that if "it shall hereafter be the pleasure of her Majesty to refer the present petition, or any similar petition, to their lordships, their lordships will of course hear it, and report to her Majesty upon it." And in disposing of the par-

ticular case he pointed out to the petitioners how they might get the benefit of section 4: "The petitioners, therefore, will take such course as they may be advised, with reference to an application to the Crown, through the Board of Control or otherwise. By possibility, in consequence of such application, if made, the matter may come here again; and their lordships will readily do their duty in hearing it."

As it is desired in this matter to provide a tribunal which will not only be impartial but will command the confidence of both British and Indian taxpayers; as the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council fulfils these conditions; as the Statute provides that the Crown can refer to it any such matters whatsoever as her Majesty shall think fit; and as their lordships are prepared readily to hear such matters on the merits, and to report to her Majesty; there seems no reason why any question in dispute between India and Great Britain should not be so dealt with. One great advantage would be that upon the difficult and delicate questions that would thus come before the Judicial Committee the case for each side could be argued by counsel, and the recommendation which would be laid before both Houses of Parliament would carry with it all the authority of a judicial decision by an absolutely independent tribunal. The issues in dispute would be mainly of a judicial kind, such as in the present case, as to where the interest of India ends and the interest of England begins, but if financial matters of a difficult kind were involved, an assessor could easily be added, specially qualified to deal with such questions. On receiving the report of the Judicial Committee it would of course be open to both Houses of Parliament to discuss and decide regarding it, but there would lie upon any one objecting to the recommendation a heavy burden to show that the award should not be accepted; and as the recommendation would not come from either political party, there would be no reason why the discussion should be squalid or that it should be made the subject of party sophistry and ingenuity. In conclusion I will only express my firm conviction that if it had not been for section 55 of the Government of India Act, and the necessity of obtaining the consent of both Houses of Parliament, we should not have enjoyed the advantage either of the excellent reciprocity principles laid down by Lord George Hamilton in his recent despatch, or of the proposals for an Arbitration Tribunal set forth in the recent debate.

II.—INJUSTICE TO INDIA.

By J. Dacosta.

"No potentate is exempt from the law that injustice will bring the highest on earth to ruin."

These words, uttered by the Prime Minister of England in his Mansion House speech in November last, must have created in the minds of many the impression that Lord Salisbury, remembering the ruin which injustice to our Indian allies and fellow subjects had wrought on the Anglo-Indian Administration in 1857-58, was resolved upon averting national disasters from the same cause, so long as his countrymen entrusted him with power. That impression, however, can scarcely continue to prevail now that the cries of injustice from India have become almost incessant. The latest is the cry raised against the injustice of taxing the people of India for the purpose of aiding the Anglo-Egyptian army in its attempt to reconquer the Sudan—an attempt in which it signally failed some twelve years ago, and in the accomplishment of which the people of India have no concern or interest whatever.

This injustice is keenly felt by both the people and the Government of India; and the latter, namely, the Governor-General and his Council, who are subordinates of the Secretary of State, have nevertheless, under the dictates of conscience, condemned the resolution of the Indian Secretary as impolitic and unjust.

The lavish expenditure of Indian revenue on previous wars carried on outside India has already so crippled the Indian Exchequer that the Government find themselves unable to provide for the first and most urgent needs of the country—namely, for the due administration of the laws. Lords Kimberley and Cross recently admitted that the vicious system of vesting Executive officers with judicial powers (under which the people complain of crying injustice) is contrary to good principle; and they asserted that the evil could not be remedied because the Government lacked the financial means of providing the necessary reform.

As regards the latest cry of injustice mentioned above, a leading article in the *Times* of July 7th, reviewing the debate which took place in the House of Commons on the previous night, expressed deep regret at "the Government having obstinately adhered to the policy of throwing a portion of the cost of the Egyptian expedition on the Indian Treasury," and recorded the following significant observations on the subject:—

"Mr. Balfour, with characteristic courage, put the whole matter in a nutshell when he said that the root of the opposition lies in a general feeling that the policy of the Government is mean. That is a perfectly accurate diagnosis, and we would simplify it by stating that the policy is thought mean because it is unjust. Neither Mr. Balfour nor Lord George Hamilton nor the Chancellor of the Exchequer succeeded in producing any defence that will avail to wipe away the stigma of meanness."

The writer then remarked, as under, on the statements by which those gentlemen attempted to palliate the Government resolution, by quoting precedents from the history of the Liberal Administration:

"This virtuous whittling down the m[illegible]er only increases

the feeling of astonishment and indignation that the Government should deliberately brave the strong opposition excited in India, outrage the sentiments of their supporters and defy public opinion at home. Fears have often been expressed of a growing disposition on the part of the Home Government to sacrifice the interests and just claims of India to the necessities of party politics in the House of Commons."

Those fears have certainly not been prematurely expressed. The growing disposition complained of is inherent to political power, which constantly strives to extend its limits, and is impelled in the strife by every step which it succeeds in taking beyond its constitutional bound. Lemontey justly observed: "L'usage de l'arbitraire augmente sans relâche le besoin de l'arbitraire."

It was in view of that dangerous disposition, which the Stuarts unscrupulously indulged in, that the British Constitution imposed on the Executive power the duty of applying to Parliament for war supplies before it involved the nation in actual warfare. The obvious intention of that provision was to guard against the nation being committed by actual hostilities to an aggressive war before its expediency and justice had been deliberately enquired into and acquiesced in by their elected representatives.

Now the acts referred to in the *Times*' article as "sacrificing the interests and just claims of India," consisted virtually in the diversion and misuse of her finances and in the exercise of undue pressure over her people in order to increase the Government revenue — acts by which the Home Government obtained war supplies from the Indian treasury, which enabled it to involve the nation in actual warfare without applying to Parliament as required by the British Constitution. The Executive, by violating that fundamental principle, practically usurped the right of the people of this realm to decide when, with whom, and the object for which they will go to war, and placed in the hands of the Ministry (often an ephemeral body) the power of committing the nation to a conflict which might, in their conviction, be morally and politically indefensible.

The evil is greater still. The Cabinet which obtains, through the compliance of the Indian Secretary, the command of the finances and credit of India might apply those resources to the raising of troops for employment at home, and proclaim martial law whenever a Ministry, supported by a large majority, resolved on crushing any strong political opposition which might by subtile ingenuity be represented to their supporters in the light of a criminal disturbance of the peace or a rebellion. To those who witnessed the violence of bread riots and who have watched the persevering determination of an influential faction to prevent the free importation of bread stuffs, in order to raise their price in the home markets, the presumed contingency will perhaps not appear utterly improbable.

The war in the Sudan, to which the nation is now committed, was entered upon suddenly with supplies diverted from the Egyptian and Indian Treasuries, before Parliament had an opportunity of deliberating on its expediency or its justice; and the ignorance of the nation regarding the precise motive of the war became apparent from questions being eagerly asked whether the invasion of the Sudan had for its object to assist Italy or to extend the Khedive's territory, or to justify our continued occupation of of Egypt or to secure the safety of the Egyptian frontier or to redeem our failure in the previous Sudan war. Even now that the war has been raging for months, and has involved the expenditure of much blood and treasure, its precise motive is still a matter of dispute and uncertainty—a state of things which reflects on the dignity of a great nation whose institutions are professedly based on the principle that the supreme power in the State lies in the will of the people as expressed by their representatives in Parliament.

The resolution under section 55 of the Act of 1858 was submitted in the House of Lords on July 16th, and the mover, referring to the history of the clause, said:—

"When the Bill was passed through the other House of Parliament, it had a clause proposed by Mr. Gladstone to the effect that, unless the consent of Parliament was given, her Majesty's forces charged on the Indian revenues should not be employed in any operation beyond the Indian frontier; and when the Bill came up to your lordships' House an amendment was moved by the Prime Minister at the time, who thought it necessary to apply a financial check to such an exercise of power."

From this statement it is evident that the amendment, which professed by a powerful check more effectually to carry out the intention of Parliament, actually frustrated that intention by removing the positive interdiction which the original clause had provided through subjecting the exercise of the power in question to the previous consent of Parliament.

Lord Salisbury, speaking on the resolution on July 16th, took his stand once more on the high ground of justice, and said:—

"I heartily join in everything that has been said by noble lords opposite as to the necessity of convincing the multitudes of India of our sense of justice and of our desire to do them justice and to respect their interests and rights. But I have an equal respect for the interests and rights of British taxpayers. I believe that the Sudan expedition will be of great benefit to Egypt and India. But by moving Indian troops we were not actuated by the desire to send them there for the purpose of taking their part in that expedition. [*See Lord Rosebery's speech exposing the sophistry of this statement.*] The question before us is this—Is the Indian or the British taxpayer to defend Suakin? The southern littoral of the Red Sea is of interest to India. It is true that, as matters stood a few years ago, that littoral depended on Egypt for its defence. Can it be said in such circumstances that India has no interest in the southern shores of the Red Sea or of the Gulf of Aden, which are continuations of the Suez Canal? If these shores fell into the hands of another Power, it would be India and not England that would suffer the most, because the former would be deprived of her military supplies. The defence of Aden is

paid for entirely by India. This shows what interest India has in the southern littoral of the Red Sea."

It might be argued with equal force that India is greatly interested in gratifying the Sultan of Turkey, seeing that she paid the entire cost of the ball which was given to that Sovereign.

Lord Salisbury concluded by saying:—

"If you refuse this vote the result will be that the account of the revenue of India will show so much money gained by lending Indian troops to this country."

That India can lend a portion of her army for carrying on a war of most uncertain duration in a distant land, shows that her army is in excess of her requirements; and the conclusion which suggests itself is that the large additions made to that army in 1885 and subsequently were sanctioned on insufficient pleas, or with the view of placing at the disposal of the Home Government surplus forces to be used for Imperial purposes, free of Parliamentary control, under section 55 of the Act of 1858 as modified in the House of Lords in the manner mentioned above.

SWÂMI VIVEKANÂNDA IN LONDON.

During the London season, Swâmi Vivekânanda has been teaching and lecturing to considerable numbers of people who have been attracted by his doctrine and philosophy. Most English people fancy that England has a practical monopoly of missionary enterprise, almost unbroken save for a small effort on the part of France. I therefore sought the Swâmi in his temporary home in South Belgravia to enquire what message India could possibly send to England, apart from the remonstrances she has too often had to make on the subject of home charges, judicial and executive functions combined in one person, the settlement of expenses connected with Sudanese and other expeditions.

"It is no new thing," said the Swâmi composedly, "that India should send forth missionaries. She used to do so under the Emperor Asoka, in days when the Buddhist faith was younger, when she had something to teach surrounding nations."

"Well, might one ask why she ever ceased doing so, and why she has now begun again?"

"She ceased because she grew selfish, forgot the principle that nations and individuals alike subsist and prosper by a system of give and take. Her mission to the world has always been the same. It is spiritual, the realm of introspective thought has been hers through all the ages, abstract science, metaphysics, logic, are her special domain. In reality my mission to England is an outcome of England's to India. It has been hers to conquer, to govern, to use her knowledge of physical science to her advantage and ours. In trying to sum up India's contribution to the world, I am reminded of a Sanskrit and an English idiom. When you say a man dies, your phrase is 'He gave up the ghost,' whereas we say, 'He gave up the body.' Similarly, you more than imply that the body is the chief part of man by saying it possesses a soul. Whereas we say a man is a soul and possesses a body. These are but small ripples on the surface, yet they show the current of your national thought. I should like to remind you how Schopenhauer predicted that the influence of Indian philosophy upon Europe would be as momentous when it became well known, as was the revival of Greek and Latin learning at the close of the Dark Ages. Oriental research is making great progress; a new world of ideas is opening to the seeker after truth."

"And is India finally to conquer her conquerors?"

"Yes, in the world of ideas. England has the sword, the material world, as our Muhammadan conquerors had before her. Yet Akbar the Great became practically a Hindu; educated Muhammadans, the Sufis, are hardly to be distinguished from Hindus; they do not eat cow, and in other ways conform to our usage. Their thought has become permeated by ours."

"So that is the fate you foresee for the lordly sahib? Just at this moment he seems to be a long way off it."

"No, it is not so remote as you imply. In the world of religious ideas the Hindu and the Englishman have much in common, and there is proof of the same thing among other religious communities. Where the English ruler or civil servant has had any knowledge of India's literature, especially her philosophy, there exists the ground of a common sympathy, a territory constantly widening. It is not too much to say that only ignorance is the cause of that exclusive—sometimes even contemptuous—attitude assumed by some."

"Yes, it is the measure of folly. Will you say why you went to America rather than to England on your mission?"

"That was a mere accident—a result of the World's Parliament of Religions being held in Chicago at the time of the World's Fair, instead of in London, as it ought to have been. The Rájá of Mysore and some other friends sent me to America as the Hindu representative. I stayed there three years, with the exception of last summer and this summer, when I came to lecture in London. The Americans are a great people, with a great future before them. I admire them very much, and found many kind friends among them. They are less prejudiced than the English, more ready to weigh and examine a new idea, to value it in spite of newness. They are most hospitable too; far less time is lost in showing one's credentials, as it were. You travel in America, as I did, from city to city, always lecturing among friends. I saw Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Washington, Desmoines, Memphis, and numbers of other places."

"And leaving disciples in each of them?"

"Yes, disciples, but not organisations. That is no part of my work. Of these there are enough in all conscience. Organisations need men to manage them; they must seek power, money, influence. Often they struggle for domination, and even fight."

"Could the gist of this mission of yours be summed up in a few words? Is it comparative religion you want to teach?"

"It is really the philosophy of religion, the kernel of all its outward forms. All forms of religion have

an essential and a non-essential part. If we strip from them the latter, there remains the real basis of all religion, which all forms of religion possess in common. Unity is behind them all. We may call it God, Allah, Jahvé, the Spirit, Love, it is the same unity that animates all life, from its lowest form to its noblest manifestation in man. It is on this unity we need to lay stress, whereas in the west, and indeed everywhere, it is on the non-essential that men are apt to lay stress. They will fight and kill each other for these forms, to make their fellows conform. Seeing that the essential is love of God and love of man, this is curious, to say the least."

"I suppose a Hindu could never persecute."

"He never yet has done so: he is the most tolerant of all the races of men. Considering how profoundly religious he is, one might have thought that he would persecute those who believe in no God. The Jains regard such belief as sheer delusion; yet no Jain has ever been persecuted. In India the Muhammadans were the first who ever took the sword."

"What progress does the doctrine of essential unity make in England? Here we have a thousand sects."

"They must gradually disappear as liberty and knowledge increase. They are founded on the non-essential, which by the nature of things cannot survive. The sects have served their purpose, which was that of an exclusive brotherhood on lines comprehended by those within it. Gradually we reach the idea of universal brotherhood by flinging down the walls of partition which separate such aggregations of individuals. In England the work proceeds slowly, possibly because the time is not more than ripe for it; but all the same, it makes progress. Let me call your attention to the similar work that England is engaged upon in India. Modern caste distinction is a barrier to India's progress. It narrows, restricts, separates. It will crumble before the advance of ideas.

"Yet some Englishmen, and they are not the least sympathetic to India, nor the most ignorant of her history, regard caste as in the main beneficent. One may easily be too much europeanised. You yourself condemn many of our ideals as materialistic."

"True. No reasonable person aims at assimilating India to England; the body is made by the thought that lies behind it. The body politic is thus the expression of national thought, and in India of thousands of years of thought. To europeanise India is therefore an impossible and foolish task: the elements of progress were always actively present in India. As soon as a peaceful government was there, these have always shown themselves. From the time of the Upanishads down to the present day nearly all our great teachers have wanted to break through the barriers of caste, *i.e.*, caste in its degenerate state, not the original system. What little good you see in the present caste clings to it from the original caste, which was the most glorious social institution. Budha tried to re-establish caste in its original form. At every period of India's awakening, there have always been great efforts made to break down caste. But it must always be *we* who build up a new India as an effect and continuation of her past, assimilating helpful foreign ideas wherever they may be found. Never can it be *they*; growth must proceed from within. All that England can do is to help India to work out her own salvation. All progress at the dictation of another, whose hand is at India's throat, is valueless, in my opinion. The highest work can only degenerate when slave-labour produces it."

"Have you given any attention to the Indian National Congress movement?"

"I cannot claim to have given much; my work is in another part of the field. But I regard the movement as significant, and heartily wish it success. A nation is being made out of India's different races. I sometimes think they are no less various than the different peoples of Europe. In the past, Europe has struggled for India's trade, a trade which has played a tremendous part in the civilisation of the world; its acquisition might almost be called a turning-point in the history of humanity. We see the Dutch, Portuguese, French, and English contending for it in succession. The discovery of America may be traced to the indemnification the Venetians sought in the far distant West for the loss they suffered in the East."

"Where will it end?"

"It will certainly end in the working out of India's homogeneity, in her acquiring what we may call democratic ideas. Intelligence must not remain the monopoly of the cultured few; it will be disseminated from higher to lower classes. Education is coming, and compulsory education will follow. The immense power of our people for work must be utilised. India's potentialities are great, and will be called forth."

"Has any nation ever been great without being a great military power?"

"Yes," said the Swâmi without a moment's hesitation. "China has. Amongst other countries, I have travelled in China and Japan. To-day China is like a disorganised mob; but in the heyday of her greatness she possessed the most admirable organisation any nation has yet known. Many of the devices and methods we term modern were practised by the Chinese for hundreds and even thousands of years. Take competitive examinations as an illustration."

"Why did she become disorganised?"

"Because she could not produce men equal to the system. You have the saying that men cannot be made virtuous by Act of Parliament; the Chinese experienced it before you. And that is why religion is of deeper importance than politics, since it goes to the root, and deals with the essentials of conduct."

"Is India conscious of the awakening that you allude to?"

"Perfectly conscious. The world perhaps sees it chiefly in the Congress movement and in the field of social reform; but the awakening is quite as real in religion, though it works more silently."

"The West and East have such different ideals of life. Ours seems to be the perfecting of the social state. Whilst we are busy seeing to these matters, Orientals are meditating on abstractions. Here has Parliament been discussing the payment of the Indian army in the Sudan. All the respectable

section of the Conservative press has made a loud outcry against the unjust decision of the Government, whereas you probably think the whole affair not worthy attention."

"But you are quite wrong," said the Swâmi, taking the paper and running his eye over extracts from the Conservative journals. "My sympathies in this matter are naturally with my country. Yet it reminds one of the old Sanskrit proverb: 'You have sold the elephant, why quarrel over the goad?' India always pays. The quarrels of politicians are very curious. It will take ages to bring religion into politics."

"One ought to make the effort very soon all the same."

"Yes, it is worth one's while to plant an idea in the heart of this great London, surely the greatest governing machine that has ever been set in motion. I often watch it working, the power and perfection with which the minutest vein is reached, its wonderful system of circulation and distribution. It helps one to realize how great is the Empire, and how great its task. And with all the rest, it distributes thought. It would be worth a man's while to place some ideas in the heart of this great machine so that they might circulate to the remotest part.

The Swâmi is a man of distinguished appearance. Tall, broad, with fine features enhanced by his picturesque Eastern dress, his personality is very striking. Swâmi is a title meaning master; Vivekânanda is an assumed name implying the bliss of discrimination. By birth, he is a Bengali, and by education, a graduate of Calcutta University. The Swâmi has taken the vow of Sanyasa, renunciation of all property, position, and name. His gifts as an orator are high. He can speak for an hour and a-half without a note, or the slightest pause for a word. Towards the end of September his lectures at St. George's Road will be resumed for a few weeks before his departure for Calcutta.

C. S. B.

K. S. RANJITSINHJI.

(By an Expert in Cricket.)

At a time when the ends of the earth are "together joined in cricket's manly toil," and the mother of the sport is contending with the child that is now her equal, it is a curious coincidence that a Hindu born and bred should incontestably surpass, as a batsman, all his colleagues in an England eleven. There were no few heartburnings when, amongst the English team chosen to meet the Australians at Lord's in the first test match, his name was not included, and no such explanation as that he is not of English birth proved in any way satisfactory to his countless admirers. But when his election for the second trial at Manchester resulted in the greatest achievement of the year's cricket, no Englishman was as popular among his compatriots as K. S. Ranjitsinhji. It must be said that his cricket is made in England. Though there were English masters who played cricket at the Rajkumar College, the play was not of a high order. It was not until he was nearly twenty years old that he had an opportunity of playing really good cricket. So that he is even now not much more than three years of age as a cricketer.

In the summer of 1892, having arrived in England with the view of pursuing his studies at Cambridge University, he resumed his boyish acquaintance with the summer sport, and on a memorable occasion for English cricket he was asked to fill a casual vacancy in the eleven of his college (Trinity). From that day his attainment of the first rank of exponents of the game was assured. He at once obtained his college colours, and in the spring of the following year was included in the team which met Oxford. His skill was so marked that he was able to choose his county, and at once set about qualifying himself to represent Sussex—a chivalrous choice, inasmuch as that county was in very low water at the time. As he had not been born in England, a two years' residential qualification was necessary, and he went to Brighton in 1893 chiefly with the view of assisting Sussex when qualified. He appeared for that county last year.

His performances as a Cambridge "blue" were, indeed, disappointing, for he scored no more than 9 runs in his two innings. But in the year's cricket for his University he stood third on the batting list with an average of the veriest trifle under 30 runs, though his highest single innings was 58, thus demonstrating in his first season that which has been his most valuable characteristic, his consistency. In 1894 he was unable to play for the University, except in one match when he made 41 for once out, and in that year he played but sixteen innings in first class cricket and stood eighth on the list of batsmen.

Early last season he was recognised as one of the three men between whom the honour of the greatest aggregates of runs during the year would be likely to be shared. He played but 39 innings against the 48 of W. G. Grace and the 50 of Abel. Had he equalled their numbers of attempts he might have surpassed their scores, for he improved as the season waned. As it was he barely escaped an average of 50, and, everything being taken into consideration, it may probably be said that the champion only was his superior as a batsman. Among his most brilliant double performances for Sussex were 95 and 57 against Somerset, 38 and not out 137 against Oxford, 59 and 74 against Yorkshire, 83 and 41 against Hampshire, 51 and not out 53 against Kent. He did not play in North *v.* South, Gentlemen *v.* Players, or Rest of England *v.* Stoddart's team.

His exploits this year are fresh in every one's memory. At the end of the great match at Manchester his total of runs for the season was within 100 of those he scored throughout last year's play, and he had made 250 in excess of the champion, who had played three innings more than the Prince. His average was exactly 61, and he held a good lead of the popular Surrey professional Abel, with whom for a long time he had been practically level. At present, therefore, he bids fair to carry off the honours of first place in total score and in the averages from all the home-born cricketers of the country.

Though it is impossible within the limits of one article to refer in detail to all the great innings he has played this year, space must be found for an

account of his greatest achievement, his display at Manchester. It was great in itself, greater in its occasion, and greatest in the adverse circumstances under which it was accomplished. At any time to score 216 runs for once out is a great feat, to score them against the best bowling of a nation is greater, and to score them amidst a succession of more or less pitiable failures on the part of other batsmen is greatest of all. Australia had put together a grand score, one which England might hope to rival but not greatly to surpass, and the two men whose records against Australian bowling were greatest went for 17 runs. Yet Ranjitsinhji played as if victory were secure, and, with but one worthy supporter, displayed fearless cricket when all his partners manifested concern if not alarm. He was out at last to a beautiful catch low down at point which would more often be missed than not. And England had to follow on 181 runs behind. Then was the Indian's opportunity in England's extremity. Three hundred runs save one came from the bat, and of these he was responsible for 154, and was not out at the close. In fact, could anyone have been found to stay with him, he would in all probability have been at the wicket at the end of the day. Nothing that could be tried had the least effect upon him. All sorts and conditions of balls he treated with the same masterly and watchful ability. All the traps which the wiliness of Giffen, Trott and McKibbin could lay were in vain spread in his sight, and every ball which offered a chance of runs was promptly despatched in the proper direction. With Trumble's straighter and better pitched deliveries he was more careful. It was a great exhibition of the art and science of batting, and one which for long may remain unequalled.

There are some natural advantages which Ranjitsinhji does not possess. He is not tall, he is not particularly strongly built. Most of our best batsmen who are not of great stature, are sturdily framed. But the Prince is neither of the mastiff nor of the bulldog type. He is a typical Oriental in physical appearance and has all the agility and rapidity of movement which are associated with the Asiatic in action. To look at his face and form when he is in the pavilion, and then when he is batting or fielding, one would hardly imagine that the two were the same man. It is the difference between the tiger at rest and the tiger in pursuit. His style may fairly be described as the cricket poetry of motion. Some of his strokes are simply marvellous; they are as swift, as subtle, and as certain as the rapid yet measured movements of an Indian juggler. He knows, one would say instinctively, if one did not feel that it must be due to the peculiar sensibility of his sight, just where the ball will be at a given instant, and his arms and his eyes are in perfect unison. He plays later at the ball than do most English batsmen, and no doubt he can afford to allow the break to take effect on a ball, before attempting to play it, with comparative safety. To see him stand unmoved as a ball passes within an inch or two of his body is amazing, but to watch the stroke with which he puts a ball head-high to leg over his shoulder, borders upon the uncanny; no one else would think of doing more than defending his head. Then his half-glance, half-push stroke to the on side of the wicket, when does it fail, and where can a more effective hit be found? Not even in the beautiful cut something in front of point, nor in the swift and low late cut through the slips, which he makes with such a graceful movement of the sinuous arms and supple wrists. Nor must it be thought that Ranjitsinhji is deficient in power, while grace is his special attribute. Those who have seen his straight drive when a fast bowler sends him a slightly over-pitched ball, have long ago recognised that his muscles must be as steel bands, as the ball with one leap recoils from the boundary.

Apart from his batting, K. S. Ranjitsinhji is a most useful man in the field. He usually takes third man or slip, and there brings off some marvellous catches. He gives a splendid example to the dilettante fieldsman, and is a fine judge of the speed of a ball and the possibility of arresting its progress before it reaches the boundary. He has bowled, but it is to be hoped that he will not run the risk of injuring his fine skill as a batsman by endeavouring to help his county as a bowler. He is not yet twenty-four years of age, so that there is plenty of time, if there is but little room, for improvement in his cricket.

Last year W. L. Murdoch, one of the greatest batsmen who ever lived, and one of the greatest authorities on cricket, recognised in Ranjitsinhji the most reliable and the best bat in England. To this high eulogy the only remark that need now be added is that he is this year also one of the most brilliant, dashing, and unassuming of batsmen. A sprained knee has caused him to relinquish football, but he is an adept at all other sports requiring a keen eye and steady nerves, and at rackets, tennis, shooting, etc., there are few who can beat him. The fact that he is an Indian is perhaps a happy augury for the relations between England and India, and it should, at any rate, be satisfactory to the inhabitants of his own fatherland that a native-born Rajput has worthily and well established himself in England as the popular hero of the times.

OUR LONDON LETTER.

It may be of interest to analyse the division list on Mr. Morley's amendment to Lord G. Hamilton's motion of July 6th, authorising a charge upon the Indian revenues for the ordinary expenses of the Indian force despatched to Suakin. Some eighty-three members of the Indian Parliamentary Committee (including one teller, Mr. Buchanan) took part in the division, all of them voting for Mr. Morley's amendment. The chairman of the Indian Parliamentary Committee—namely, Sir W. Wedderburn—also spoke in support of the amendment.

Twenty-three "Unionist" members (including one teller Mr. Maclean) voted for Mr. Morley's amendment. Their names are as follows:—Sir J. P. Dickson-Poynder, Sir H. S. King, Sir Lewis M'Iver, Sir A. Scoble, Hon. A. de Tatton Egerton, Hon. Vicary Gibbs; and Messrs. J. G. A. Baird, F. G. Banbury, G. C. T. Bartley, E. W. Beckett,

M. M. Bhownaggree, T. Gibson Bowles, C. W. R. Cooke, F. W. Fison, H. S. Foster, Lawrence Hardy, Henniker Heaton, E. H. Hulse, J. Kenyon, J. Maclean, E. R. P. Moon, W. Morrison, and J. Parker Smith.

The following four "Unionist" members also voted against Lord G. Hamilton's resolution in the second division:—Sir H. S. King, Hon. Vicary Gibbs, Messrs. F. W. Fison, and J. Kenyon. In this division, taken under circumstances which are described elsewhere, the voting was much smaller than in the first division, and although the Government's majority was considerably larger than in the first division, the numbers of its supporters was less —namely, 252 as against 275. No "Unionist" member who voted for Mr. Morley's amendment voted in the second division in favour of Lord G. Hamilton's resolution.

There were 110 "Unionist" members absent from the first division. There were 36 Liberals (20 of whom were members of the Indian Parliamentary Committee) absent. There were 54 members of the Parnellite and Anti-Parnellite parties absent. Had these latter been present and voted for the amendment, the Government's majority would have been reduced to 31.

We append a tabular statement with regard to the voting on Mr. Morley's amendment:—

	There voted against the amendment	275	
	" for the amendment	190	
			465
	Add Tellers	4	
	" The Speaker	1	5
			470
Absentees.	Unionists	110	
"	Liberals	36	
"	Irish Members	54	200
	Full House		670

Mr. John Morley's speech in the House of Commons on July 6th was not entirely a success. He had accumulated a large amount of material on the subject, but the superabundance of it seemed rather to embarrass than to help him. The result was that his speech contrasted not very favourably with the earlier speech which he had delivered at Leeds. It is by no means an uncommon thing for a speech in the House of Commons to fail through excessive quantity of matter. Moreover, Mr. John Morley on the platform is, as everybody knows, a rather different person from Mr. John Morley in the House of Commons. On the platform he often "lets himself go," and stirs the emotions, besides informing the minds, of his hearers. But in the House of Commons he is a much more critical, more tentative, more self-conscious speaker. His mind seems to be fixed, as his eye undoubtedly is, on the Treasury Bench, and he seems to be asking himself at the end of every sentence how it struck the members of the Cabinet, and what sort of answer they are formulating in their minds. He proceeds to demolish, or at any rate to discuss, this imaginary answer, and the result is discursiveness, and a certain lack of incisiveness and grip. The circumstance is greatly to be regretted as few men in the House of Commons, and no other magnates of the Front Bench, are so keen or so well informed as Mr. Morley on this particular question. He has the faculty, denied to some of his colleagues, of importing a certain moral earnestness into his logical duels.

Sir Henry Fowler, who has a really wonderful fluency when he is on the winning side, made a vigorous speech at a later stage in the debate. Those who heard it said, however, that it was addressed a little too obviously to the gallery, and that his spontaneous philanthropy might have been more convincing if he had not previously reduced his swelling periods to writing.

Before and during the debate on the Indian troops the complaints of Conservative members in the lobby of the House of Commons were characteristic and instructive. Lord G. Hamilton and his colleagues urged in self-defence that their transgression was "only a little one." Curiously enough, this very fact appeared to be the chief ground of complaint among their supporters. "What is so amazing to me," said one of them, and the remark really described the attitude of the majority, "is that the Government should have deliberately provoked such a storm for a paltry £35,000." In other words, the general feeling on the Ministerialist benches was that the offence would have been more respectable if it had been on a larger scale. The doctrine may not accord with the principles of an austere morality, but it found a place in the editorial columns of the *Times*.

It is to be regretted that Mr. Dadabhai Naoroji was not in a position to express his opinion on the question in the House of Commons, especially as we happen to know that, in Mr. Naoroji's judgment, the fundamental point was equally ignored by both sides. India, Mr. Naoroji contends, has really no Imperial citizenship, and therefore the debates proceeded upon a false assumption. We find the idea of Imperial citizenship associated with India only when it is a question of bearing burdens. We hear nothing of it when it is a question of exercising rights. India, according to Mr. Naoroji, has been reduced to a mere community of helots, who have no effective voice in the management of their affairs.

We print elsewhere an article from a sporting correspondent on Mr. K. S. Ranjitsinhji's brilliant performances in the cricket field. Those who know the position which cricket now holds in the mind of the average British citizen will not be disposed to under-rate the services which Mr. Ranjitsinhji's bat has rendered to his country's cause. We may add that on July 27th he held the second place in the "first-class averages." In 34 innings he had scored 1,712 runs. His "most in an innings" was 171 "not out," he had been "not out" 4 times, and his "average" was 57·2. The only batsman whose average was better than his was Captain E. G. Wynyard. But Captain Wynyard had played only 14 innings, and his aggregate number of runs was 770. The experts agreed in saying that Mr. K. S. Ranjitsinhji was "still easily first among those who had played any large number of innings." A Manchester critic, describing Mr. Ranjitsinhji's brilliant stand against the Australians, said that the en-

thusiasm of the Lancashire crowd was such that, even if he had asked for the re-imposition of the cotton duties in their original form, he would not have been denied.

LORD WELBY'S COMMISSION.

On Wednesday, July 15th, the Royal Commission appointed a year ago to enquire into the administration and management of the military and civil expenditure of India and the apportionment of the charge between the Imperial Government and that country resumed its sittings at the India Office. The Commission have held 25 private sittings. The Commission consists of Lord Welby (chairman), Mr. L. Courtney, M.P., Mr. W. T. Jackson, M.P., Sir Donald Stewart, Bart., Sir William Wedderburn, M.P., Sir E. W. Hamilton, Sir James Peile, Sir Andrew Scoble, M.P., Mr. Buchanan, M.P., Mr. W. S. Caine, Mr. Dadabhai Naoroji, Sir R. H. Knox, Mr. Ryder, Mr. Mowbray, and Mr. Colin Campbell (secretary).

Sir R. KNOX, Accountant General of the Army, was the first witness examined. Replying to the Chairman with reference to the charge made against the Government of India on account of the British troops serving in that country, witness said the actual cost to the Exchequer of the maintenance of the British force in India consisted of every expense incurred at home which would not be incurred if it was not necessary to send the reliefs and the drafts to India. Seven pounds ten shillings was the calculated charge for training the individual soldier, recoverable from India, according to the service to which he belonged; the charge for non-commissioned officers who trained him, the waste in the form of those who deserted or died in the first year's service, the charge for young officers appointed to Indian regiments as vacancies occurred in regiments awaiting orders to be dispatched to India, and a charge for an educational establishment, where the officers underwent a certain amount of elementary education and training. Then there were charges for hospitals, &c. The total cost of these services had been calculated at £670,000 for one year, but it varied in different years. Thirty pounds was the average cost for each recruit sent out to India. That £30 included a considerable number of charges which were outside the capitation rate. The capitation grant of the British force in India had varied, at one time being £8 and at another time £10. The Indian military establishment for 1895-96 was 73,125 on which the charge of £7 10s. ahead was £548,437, exclusive of deferred pay.

Mr. DADABHAI NAOROJI: But it is not necessary to have such a large force in India. We Indians do not want it. The Indian army is quite sufficient to meet any contingency; but it is to maintain the British rule, both against Russia and the Indians.—Witness: The War Office look to supplying the demands of the Indian Government.

Mr. DADABHAI NAOROJI: But that is really the British Government.

The witness further said the justice of continuing the charge of £7 10s. per soldier recoverable from India would partly depend on the strength of the Indian establishment remaining the same for the numbers sent to India in the year not materially varying. By the short-service system a larger number of soldiers had to be enlisted, but still the charges to India compared favourably with the old system in previous years. On the other hand, India got the benefit of many British services for which no charge was made to India.

The Commission adjourned.

On Wednesday, July 22nd, the Royal Commission to enquire into the administration and management of the expenditure of India, and into the apportionment of charge between India and the United Kingdom, sat at the India office, Lord Welby presiding. Sir R. Knox, Accountant General of the Army, was further examined. Asked what he had to say to the argument of the Indian Government that they were not consulted when the War Office made changes in its organization which affected India, witness replied that it had always been the desire of the War Office to consult the Indian Office, but it was very difficult to see how, except in small matters, India could avoid accepting their proposals, and the Indian Government recognised that. Sir Donald Stewart.—But there are some very heavy charges imposed upon the Government of India by a change in the organization of the Army which has nothing to do with the efficiency of the service? Witness.—No doubt there are changes in the organization of the Army the necessity of which the Indian Government may not see very distinctly. The Commission adjourned.

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF ARTICLES IN MONTHLY AND QUARTERLY MAGAZINES ON INDIAN SUBJECTS.

JULY, 1896.

BLACKWOOD'S MAGAZINE. "The Indian Imperial Service Troops."

COUNTRY HOUSE. "Sport in the Rewah Hills, India."

TO-MORROW. "M. M. Bhownaggree."

INDIAN MAGAZINE AND REVIEW (A. Constable and Co., 2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.). Acworth, H. A., "Reminiscences of Western India." Lasia, "A Novel in a Nutshell." "Indian Gentlemen in the West." "List of Indian Ladies in the West."

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF BOOKS ON INDIAN SUBJECTS.

JULY, 1896.

ECKENSTEIN, OSCAR.............."The Karakorams and Kashmir." (Fisher Unwin) .... 6s. 0d.

SANJANA, DARAB DASTUR PESHOTAN, B.A......."The Zand I Javît Shêda Dad: or the Puhluvi version of the Avesta Vendidad, the text prescribed for the B.A. and M.A. examinations of the University of Bombay." (Education Society's Steam Press, Bombay) .... — —

BARRY, J. P.........................."The War of the League." (*Times of India*, Bombay) .. — —

DEVELIN, SERGEANT-MAJOR, R. E. ......"Views in Chitral." (Maclure and Co.) .... 30s. 0d.

RECENT OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS.

HOUSE OF COMMONS REPORTS AND PAPERS:—

[166.] EAST INDIA (FINANCIAL STATEMENT)—Return of the Indian Financial Statement for 1896-97, and of the Proceedings of the Legislative Council of the Governor-General thereon.... 1s. 2½d.

[179.] EAST INDIA (ESTIMATE)—Estimate of Revenue and Expenditure of the Government of India for the year 1895-96, compared with the results of 1894-95...................... 0s. 2d.

[180.] EAST INDIA (HOME ACCOUNTS)—Home Accounts of the Government of India, 1894-95 and 1895-96 .... 0s. 6d.

[218.] EAST INDIA (PROGRESS AND CONDITIONS)—Statement exhibiting the Moral and Material Progress and Condition of India during the year 1894-95. Thirty-first number .... 1s. 9d.

[229.] EAST INDIA (INDIAN TARIFF ACT AND THE COTTON DUTIES)—Return of Opinions and Reasons entered in the Minutes of the Proceedings of the Secretary of State in Council, with reference to the Despatch of 2nd April, 1896, to the Government of India .... 0s. 1½d.

[236.] EAST INDIA (EXPENSES OF TROOPS DESPATCHED TO AFRICA IN AID OF EGYPTIAN TROOPS)—Return of Opinions and Reasons entered in the Minutes of the Proceedings of the Secretary of State in Council .... 0s. 0½d.

[245.] EAST INDIA (MAHARAJA RANA OF JHALAWAR) Copy of Correspondence Relating to the Deposition of the Maharaj Rana of Jhalawar.. 1s. 5½d.

PAPERS BY COMMAND:—

[8,131.] EAST INDIA (SUAKIN EXPEDITION)—Correspondence between the Government of India and the Secretary of State in Council, regarding the incidence of the cost of Indian troops when employed out of India .... 0s. 3½d.

LIST OF MARINE RECORDS OF THE LATE EAST INDIA COMPANY, and of subsequent date, preserved in the Record Department of the India Office, London. Printed by Eyre and Spottiswoode — —

NOTICES.

TO CONTRIBUTORS.

The Editor of INDIA cannot hold himself responsible in any case for the return of MS. He will, however, always be glad to consider any contributions which may be submitted to him; and when postage stamps are enclosed every effort will be made to return rejected contributions promptly.—Address: Editor of INDIA, 84 and 85, PALACE CHAMBERS, WESTMINSTER, LONDON, S.W.

TO SUBSCRIBERS.

The annual subscription to INDIA (post free) is six shillings for England and six rupees for India. Subscriptions are payable in advance. Remittances, or communications relating to subscriptions or to any other matter of business connected with INDIA, should in all cases be sent to the Manager of INDIA, 84 and 85, PALACE CHAMBERS, WESTMINSTER, LONDON, S.W.

Cheques and Post-office orders should be made payable to Mr. W. Douglas Hall.

Copies of INDIA can be obtained from the Offices of the Paper; from Mr. Elliott Stock, PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON, E.C.; from Messrs. Deighton, Bell and Co., TRINITY STREET, CAMBRIDGE; and to order at any Railway Bookstall.

TO ADVERTISERS.

INDIA presents unique advantages as an advertising medium. All communications as to advertisements should be sent to the Advertisement Manager of INDIA, 84 and 85, PALACE CHAMBERS, WESTMINSTER, LONDON, S.W., who will, on application, forward lists of charges.

INDIA.

LONDON, AUGUST, 1896.

"A MASTERPIECE OF MELANCHOLY MEANNESS."

There is a happy phrase of Aristotle's to describe a hopeless bit of special pleading—namely, an argument which no man would adopt "unless he were "defending a position." Few candid readers of the debates in both Houses of Parliament, and the Parliamentary papers, on the payment of the Indian troops despatched to Suakin will deny that the arguments adopted by Lord George Hamilton and his colleagues by way of apology for their policy are, from first to last, arguments of this kind. Ministers were "defending a position." In other words, it was not cogent reasons of an admissible type that induced them to formulate their policy; it was the policy upon which they had determined that compelled them afterwards to search for plausible reasons. Yet the reasons which they were ultimately able to produce did not appear plausible even to their own most loyal supporters. The Ministerialist press, with a few unimportant exceptions, agreed in denouncing in good set terms the injustice and the meanness of the Government's policy, while in the House of Commons the Government's majority fell from 147 to 85, although most of the Irish members, whose votes would have still further reduced the majority, were absent. Lord George Hamilton's speech in defence of his Resolution was, of course, merely an amplification of his despatch of June 30th—eked out with a little irrelevant and strangely misdirected invective to raise a party cheer. One of the many difficulties of his position arose from the fact that, having demolished in the case of Mombasa a claim described by its authors, the Treasury, as stronger than the claim put forward in 1885, he persuaded himself three months afterwards that "the precedent of 1885 was applicable to the "cost of the expedition to Suakin." Then, having telegraphed this amazing decision to the Viceroy on May 15th, he actually wrote in his despatch of June 30th: "it is impossible to say that the "decisions which have been arrived at on previous "occasions are such that any very clear or definite "doctrine can be drawn from them." This tangle of inconsistencies was bad enough. But the explanation or apology finally selected by Lord George Hamilton was even worse. He imagined that he cut the Gordian knot by asserting that, while one of the numerous official theories of the objects of the operations in the Sudan made mention of the maintenance and development of orderly and settled government in Egypt, the Government of India had no greater interest than the maintenance of rapid and secure transit between India and the United Kingdom. Mr. John Morley, whose respect for the meaning of words is acknowledged by all, described this paragraph, and described it truly, as the most spurious and insincere paragraph ever printed in any despatch from any department. Mr. Morley put the really fatal question when he asked at what stage in the transactions the relevancy of this precious argument had occurred to the Government. Had any danger to rapid and secure transit between India and the United Kingdom arisen from the fact that during the past decade Khartum had not been in the possession of Egypt? In all the recent talk of Ministerialists about the necessity of re-conquering the Sudan for Egypt was there so much as a syllable to suggest that India was concerned? In short, was not India ignored in the discussion altogether until it became desirable, in the judgment of the Cabinet, to borrow Indian troops and to charge India with their ordinary expenses? The questions have only to be asked. They answer themselves. India, as Sir Donald Stewart observes in his admirable Minute, has come into the matter accidentally, because the forces of Egypt did not suffice both to take the field and to hold Suakin, and because Suakin is not blessed with a good climate. The attempt to set up a direct Indian interest in the operations is an ungenerous and, we must add, a not very honest afterthought on the part of men who, on

other grounds, had already decided that India should lend troops and nevertheless continue to pay them. That is what justifies the use of the striking, although alliterative, phrase coined by Mr. Fawcett when India was charged with the cost of the ball given in honour of the Sultan of Turkey. The policy of the Government is "a masterpiece of "melancholy meanness."

Not only do Lord George Hamilton's arguments in reply to the Treasury in the case of Mombasa stultify his compliance in the case of Suakin, but the various parts of his despatch of June 30th are inconsistent with each other. He expressly calls Lord Elgin's attention to the fact that he has throughout dwelt upon the temporary nature of the payment as an "essential condition of the "arrangement" agreed upon. That is to say, if the Indian troops remain at Suakin after December 31st next, the question of payment will come up for reconsideration. But if the claim of the Treasury is good until December 31st, how does it then become bad? Is the interest of India in the "main-"tenance and development of orderly and settled "government in Egypt" to terminate at midnight, precisely, on December 31st, 1896? Or is it merely that the Treasury will then acknowledge that the security of the Suez Canal is one thing, and the present war of "limited liability" in the Sudan another? Lord G. Hamilton only shows his appreciation of the weakness of his case when he is at such pains to argue that the borrowed force is small and the payment strictly temporary. Lord Onslow in the House of Lords, on July 16th, repeated Lord G. Hamilton's speech with almost ludicrous fidelity. But Lord Salisbury, with characteristic originality and no less characteristic indiscretion, produced a new and revised version of the Government's reasons. The object which the Government had in view in moving the Indian troops was, he said, solely the defence of Suakin. They were not to take any part in, and had nothing to do with, the Sudan expedition. Suakin had to be defended at the expense of the Indian taxpayer or of the British taxpayer, and the Government had decided that the duty properly belonged to India on the ground of superior interest in the southern littoral of the Red Sea. If this be the authorised version of the Government's policy, what becomes of Lord G. Hamilton's despatch of June 30th, which was based on the proposition that India had a direct interest in the Sudan expedition and had for that reason been required to contribute? Lord Salisbury's speech, of course, only showed for the twentieth time how utterly at a loss Ministers are to defend what they have done, and how ready they are, even at the cost of all appearance of consistency, to catch at any straw of afterthought which seems for the moment likely to help them. But Lord Salisbury's version is really as feeble as Lord George Hamilton's. If the duty of garrisoning Suakin belongs properly to India, and is not in any way connected with the Sudan expedition, then it is, to say the least, most unfortunate that the Government waited for the expedition to discover the duty. A coincidence of this kind would be open to an odious interpretation, even if we did not know, as we do, that the garrison at Suakin which the Indian troops replaced was wanted and was actually employed for the Sudan expedition, and would never have been withdrawn for that purpose if the loan of Indian troops had not been guaranteed. As for Lord Salisbury's general proposition that India is interested in a greater degree than England in the safety of the Suez Canal and the Red Sea, that is a large assumption which we need not discuss now, but which, we are very sure, any intelligent Indian would stoutly resist. Lord Salisbury's mode of proof, however, is as cynical as his statement that India is making no real contribution on the present occasion is grotesque. Aden, he says, is situated at the mouth of the Red Sea, and the defence of Aden is paid for entirely by the taxpayers of India. "This shows," the scrupulous dialectician concludes, "what an interest India has in the "southern littoral of the Red Sea." We respectfully submit that it shows nothing of the kind. What it shows is merely that a certain charge has been laid upon India by the British Government, and Lord Salisbury, who has been Secretary of State for India, knows, or ought to know, that the Government of India has for more than thirty years protested against the charge as unjust, and that the questions connected with it have now been referred to Lord Welby's Commission. If the proceedings of that Commission, and the valuable documents laid before it, had been, as they ought to have been, made public from the outset, the "melancholy meanness" of Lord Salisbury and his colleagues would have been more difficult, if not impossible.

Mr. Morley in the course of his comprehensive speech—it was, in fact, not so much a speech as a discursive review of almost superabundant material—asked what would be thought of him if he borrowed from Lord G. Hamilton a pair of carriage horses for an Egyptian friend, and, at the end of the summer, returned them with a bill for the cost of the hay, the straw, the shoeing, and the grooming. The apt illustration was received with laughter and cheers, but it really understated the case. For (1) the loan of Indian troops is virtually compulsory, (2) it is possible only because the size of the Indian army is regulated by the borrower, and (3) the loan is required not because the borrower is in need—there are British soldiers enough to garrison Suakin—but because Indian troops are able to stand a hot

climate. In other words, India pays a sort of penalty, instead of receiving some consideration, for the special fitness of her soldiers to do a piece of work in which she repudiates any interest. England, being strong, ought to be scrupulously fair, and even generous, in her dealings with India, which is weak, and has no votes in the House of Commons. We owe it, as Lord Rosebery well said, to our honour and our dignity to show a singular tenderness for the interests of India when we are judges, and judges in a case to which we are parties. But the humiliating truth is that, while we compel an unwilling contribution from India on occasions like the present, there is a marked absence of reciprocity when the position of the parties is reversed. In short, the history of our transactions in both capacities — as lenders and as borrowers — unpleasantly recalls Thrasymachus's definition of justice as "the interest of the stronger." Fortunately, there now seems good reason to hope that this particular type of meanness has been perpetrated for the last time. It behoves us, indeed, to be cautious in indulging in opinions about the future in view of the pious hopes expressed by Lord Cross and Mr. W. L. Jackson in 1887, and falsified, apparently with their authors' approval, in 1896. But it may, perhaps, be safely asserted, after the storm of indignation which the present injustice has excited, that no British Government is likely to repeat the offence. We confess that we have more faith in this wholesome fear of public opinion than in the saving grace of the so-called "principles" formulated by Lord George Hamilton in his despatch, and printed on another page. The first two "principles" merely register a commonplace in language somewhat too large for the occasion, while the third "principle" permits, and was obviously framed after the event to justify, the injustice which has now been committed. For the rest, Lord Salisbury's vague suggestion of a new and impartial tribunal to consider the relative interests and rights of India and the United Kingdom is discussed elsewhere by Sir W. Wedderburn, M.P. Nothing could be better than to secure the equitable consideration of all such questions by a judicial tribunal. Nothing could be worse than to weaken the hold of the House of Commons upon Indian questions or to diminish its interest in them. It may perhaps be regarded by some as a rather sinister sign that Lord Salisbury referred to his proposal in a context of disparagement of Parliamentary discussion, and of regrets at the disclosure of departmental communications. He applied the epithet "squalid" to the discussion—not to the policy which rendered discussion necessary. But, whatever may be Lord Salisbury's motives, his proposal deserves to be considered on its merits, and Lord Welby and his colleagues will doubtless respond to the invitation for suggestions. At least three further results the policy of the Cabinet, and the recent discussion, ought to produce. They ought to stimulate the Indian demand for direct representation in Parliament. They ought to strengthen the protests against the maintenance of the British army in India at its present numerical strength. "If," said Lord Salisbury (then Lord Cranborne) in 1867, "if the garri-"son which we keep in India is necessary for "maintaining that country in security and peace, it "ought not to be rashly diminished. If it is too "large, and India can for any length of time con-"veniently spare these troops, the Indian population "ought not to be so unnecessarily taxed." Finally, recent events ought to develope the interest, as they have illustrated the responsibility, of British citizens in Indian affairs. If this end be secured, the "masterpiece of melancholy meanness" will not, after all, have been wholly and solely deplorable.

NATURAL LAW IN THE POLITICAL WORLD.

In an age which expects to "run and read" at the same time—in which newspapers publish lists of "Authors of the Week" and "Books of the Day" with apparently unconscious satire—a curiously artificial process is adopted for keeping alive the memory of great men whom we feel we ought not to forget. We search our calendars, or rather let some enterprising editor do it for us, and Burns or Gibbon is presented as a fresh dish to our jaded literary appetites, the hero of a centenary hurriedly celebrated and quickly dismissed. It is not much, though it is better than nothing. In the meantime the author who died twenty or thirty years ago runs every risk of being unjustly forgotten. He has not been long enough in his grave to be disinterred for fresh obsequies, and though he may be remembered with some enthusiasm by a few elderly people, they are, of course, old fogeys who have not kept pace with the newer literature on the subject, and we attach little importance to their opinions. Such at least must be the view of those who feel the literary pulse of the nation through its press. One would fain believe, however, that the book of a quarter of a century ago is still alive and doing good work in many a quiet library and secluded study, read and pondered still sometimes by sober thinkers who make little noise in the newspapers. This hope derives some encouragement from the fact that new editions of "Physics and Politics" are still called for, though it was first published in the early seventies, and its author died in 1877. "It is," says Mr. R. H. Hutton in his memoir of Walter Bagehot, "a book in which I find new force and depth every

[1] "Physics and Politics: Thoughts on the Application of the Principles of 'Natural Selection' and 'Inheritance' to Political Society." By Walter Bagehot. New and cheaper edition. (London: Kegan Paul and Co.)

[1] "Social Rights and Duties: Addresses to Ethical Societies." By Leslie Stephen. 2 vols. (London: Swan Sonnenschein.)

"time I take it up afresh." Those who care that a work of great intellectual force, of great literary charm, and possessing a rare power of stimulating thought in the reader, should have as long a life as possible, may rejoice that "Physics and Politics" is not buried underneath Mr. Kidd's "Social Evolution" or other more recent and ponderous tomes.

The title that Bagehot selected for his essay is a little obscure and misleading, for "Physics" generally stands for the one science to which the theory of evolution has not yet been applied. By "Physics" Bagehot meant "Nature," and the adaptation of Mr. Drummond's famous title which has been prefixed to this article describes his subject fairly enough. The sciences, especially the newer sciences, have made such vast strides since 1870 that it might have been expected that a work on sociology written so long ago would be of little scientific value now, whatever its literary interest might be. But the truth is that sociology, in spite of its fascination and of the results expected from it by its first enthusiastic professors, remains almost as much in its infancy now as then. Here is what Mr. Leslie Stephen, a sufficiently high authority, says in the interesting volume of studies that he published only the other day:

"What remains? There is, shall we say, no science of sociology—merely a heap of vague, empirical observations, too flimsy to be useful in strict logical inference. I should, I confess, be apt to say so myself. . . . . We have not the data necessary for obtaining anything like precise laws. A mathematician can tell you precisely what he means when he speaks of bodies moving under the influence of an attraction which varies inversely as the square of the distance. But what are the attractive forces which hold together the body politic? They are a number of human passions, which even the acutest psychologists are as yet quite unable to analyse or to classify: they act according to laws of which we have hardly the vaguest inkling; and, even if we possessed any definite laws, the facts to which they have to be applied are so amazingly complex as to defy any attempt at assigning results. There is, so far as I can see, no ground for supposing that there is or ever can be a body of precise truths at all capable of comparison with the exact sciences. ("Social Rights and Duties," vol. i, p. 53-54.)

Yet he adds immediately, "But this obvious truth, "though it implies very narrow limits to our hopes of "scientific results, does not force us to renounce the "application of scientific method. . . . . A change "of method and spirit is, in my opinion, of con-"siderable importance, and very vague results "would still imply an improvement in the chaos of "what now passes for political philosophy." Now Bagehot was peculiarly fitted to help towards this improvement in spirit and method, because he united in an eminent degree the qualities of the student and the practical man. Mr. Leslie Stephen has noted the contrast so often to be found in the shrewd man of business between his "keen vigorous good sense "upon immediate questions of the day" and "the "paltry little outworn platitudes which he introduces "when he wants to tag his arguments with sounding "principles." From that contrast Bagehot was saved by his philosophical studies, just as his knowledge of the world saved him from becoming a "mere "black beetle" of a student. In the paradoxical thesis of his first published letters—that the French are too clever a nation for free institutions, which are only suited to a slow-witted people like the British—it is easy to see the influence of his own practical experience of life in rural England and in the Paris of the *Coup d'Etat*. The stolid Conservatism of Somersetshire moved him to admiration quite genuine though largely mixed with humorous contempt, while the political mobility of the French alarmed as well as interested him. The teaching of ancient history seemed to him the same: the empire of quick-witted Athens, mother of arts and song, crumbling away in a few short years, while Rome, with far less intellectual ability, builds up an empire that endures for ages. The same thesis, only less paradoxically stated, underlay "Physics and Politics." The first great need of early man is law, no matter what. Nations which obtained a fixed law by processes of incredible difficulty soon destroyed those neighbours that did not. The first essential step towards civilisation is "the cementing "of the cake of custom." The next is "the break-"ing of the cake of custom." The cake may be broken too soon, or it may never be broken at all. In the latter case we get the phenomenon, so familiar in the East, of "arrested civilisation"; Athens is an instance of the former kind of failure. The main influence that breaks the yoke of custom is the introduction of discussion into government. Discussion, when it can be borne, is useful also as helping to retard action; the impulse to action, most valuable in uncivilised times, is inherited to a harmful extent by civilised man.

Such is a brief summary of the argument of "Physics and Politics." It can convey little idea of the brilliance and suggestiveness of the book. Pregnant sayings abound, of which the following are specimens: "The whole history of civilisation is "strewn with creeds and institutions which were "invaluable at first and deadly afterwards" (p. 74). "Dryden had a dream of an early age, 'when wild "'in woods the noble savage ran'; but 'when lone "'in woods the cringing savage crept,' would have "been more like all we know of that early, bare, "painful period" (p. 55). Or take the explanation of the strength of caste-nations in early times contrasted with their subsequent unprogressiveness: "The whole of a caste nation is more various than "the whole of a non-caste nation, but each caste "itself is more monotonous than anything is, or can "be, in a non-caste nation" (p. 149).

The idea of evolution is so attractive and so fruitful in its application to the history of the human race, and so certain to dominate the minds of students of political science, that it may be well to end this article with one caution in regard to it. Bagehot, we have seen, was impressed by the danger of excessive action, and therefore emphasised the need for deliberation. There is an opposite danger to which the student of sociology, impressed by the working of "natural law," is more likely to fall a victim. He may feel that it is useless to fight against "nature," and drift into a fatalistic attitude towards politics. Let him remember, therefore, that man, unlike other parts of nature, can consciously modify his environment, and that he forfeits his highest privilege and abandons his highest duty if he does not strive to modify it for the good of the coming generations.

INDIAN TROOPS AT SUAKIN.

ORDINARY EXPENSES CHARGED ON INDIAN REVENUES.

I.—THE DEBATE IN THE COMMONS.

Our Parliamentary Correspondent writes:—The debate in the House of Commons on July 6th was marred by one or two secondary but important influences. The first was that an unexpected discussion on a private Bill opened up in front of it and delayed the commencement of the debate by nearly a couple of hours. As, despite this delay at the beginning, the debate still had to close at the usual time, it was cut short and practically a most important two hours and a half, and a dozen or more speeches, were cut out of the middle. The earlier part of the debate had not half run its course, nearly a score of members being on their feet attempting to obtain the right to speak, when Sir M. Hicks-Beach rose to begin the closing speeches. Thus a large number of supporters of the Government, who on this occasion were going to speak against their leaders, were silenced by an unavoidable accident and the moral effect of their action was entirely lost. But this was not the most important element. There is another which probably influenced the result profoundly. It is one of the curious results of the length of the sittings of the House of Commons that members go away for a couple of hours in the middle of the evening for dinner but the speech-making (it cannot then be called debate) is continued in their absence. The Speaker remains in the chair (except for a very brief interval,) the orator is on his legs, but he has no audience except one or two, and a-half a dozen other members who are waiting to get the chance of speaking when he sits down. The result is that although these speeches are delivered and appear in the newspapers, and have perhaps as much weight as others with the reading public, they are something entirely different from the earlier and the later speeches delivered to a large and attentive audience in the House and have little or no effect upon the minds of the absent members who, an hour or two later, will vote in the division lobby. Owing to the later commencement of the debate, and the great length of Lord G. Hamilton's and Mr. Morley's speeches, the "dinner hour" had arrived and the audience to a large extent disappeared before the important speeches of Mr. Maclean and those who followed him were delivered. The effect which these speeches would have had if they had been delivered an hour or two earlier was lost, and and the vast bulk of the members made up their minds on the subject from what they heard of Lord G. Hamilton and Mr. Morley at the beginning and Mr. Balfour at the end.

All this was very unfortunate, for seldom if ever was there an audience in the House of Commons more ready to be swayed one way or the other by the speeches delivered in debate. It was obvious that scores of members were uncertain how to vote, and they waited to see whether Lord G. Hamilton on one side, or Mr. Morley on the other, could make such a case as to leave their judgment decided. Members of the House of Commons, especially Lancashire Conservative members who owe their seats to the fight over the cotton duties, are just now peculiarly sensitive about Indian affairs. The agitation on behalf of justice to India has touched their consciences, or their instincts of self-preservation, and the revolt of nearly the whole Conservative press against the action of the Government had thoroughly awakened them to the danger of giving a blind, unheeding, party vote. Almost each man was prepared to think for himself. This made the situation almost unique. It was first apparent in the anxious air of attention with which the great audience settled down to listen to Lord G. Hamilton, and the chilling, critical silence in which he was allowed to proceed. His speech evidently did not satisfy his audience. There was a little relief in the mere party points, not particularly relevant to the issue before the House, which gave Conservative members an opportunity for cheers towards the end. But this left the real matter which was troubling their minds undecided. They were open to be swayed either way by something higher than dry quibbles about precedents, some appeal to high principle, to some emotional feeling of patriotism or generous loyalty to subject or kindred races. Lord George failed, and thus a great opportunity was left for Mr. Morley—one of those great opportunities which come so seldom to a man in the House of Commons. Party loyalty and all the small influences which control the voting in the House were relaxed. Opinion was in a fluid state, the votes of his party opponents were to be had by the exercise of some striking oratorical force which should sweep members into the lobby. But Mr. Morley did not rise to the occasion. He spoke for nearly an hour and a-half, he went down to the dull level of arguing about past transactions and old precedents, and dwelt on points which emphasised ordinary party divisions, keeping up and strengthening the partition which for once might have been thrown down. Slowly the audience slipped through his fingers. The tension on their party loyalty, which was almost a hunger for some good sound reason for voting against their leaders, was relaxed. They began to feel more comfortable in the thought that they might vote in obedience to the party whip after all, and then they found it was dinner time and that they might as well go and dine.

Mr. Maclean's declaration that if the matter had been left to the independent judgment of the House the Government would not have had many supporters was delivered when the truth had already half faded out of it. His speech—bright, able, forcible—did much to retrieve lost ground, but the audience whom it might have swayed had to a large extent already disappeared into the dining rooms. Then came Mr. V. Gibb's indignant protest, followed by Mr. Bhownaggree, who spoke to absolutely empty benches. Then, the "dinner hour" passing away and members slowly returning, there was a rush of a score of members, competing in their endeavours to speak. There was not a large audience to hear Sir A. Scoble's and Sir W. Wedderburn's serious warning against the far-reaching evil attending on the

great injustice about to be perpetrated. Meanwhile the Whips were busy in the lobbies and elsewhere putting pressure on the unhappy members. They were threatened that if the Government were defeated there would be an immediate dissolution, and they would be plunged into a fight in the constituencies to retain their seats—a fight which would end many a Parliamentary career. The audience slowly gathered again, this time in a different mood from that in which they had listened to Lord George Hamilton five hours earlier. Sir M. Hicks-Beach took the field and made a much better speech than his colleagues, and then when Sir Henry Fowler's turn came to close the debate for the Opposition nearly all chance of really influencing a large section of the House had passed. He thundered in vain against the stone wall of restored party discipline. By the time Mr. Balfour rose his party was fairly compact and had made up its mind to vote with him. There was now once more the boisterous, irresponsible feeling of ordinary obedience in the air. The cheers, which could not have been evoked a few hours earlier, now came readily enough, and Mr. Balfour, fully understanding the crisis through which he had passed, and which was not yet entirely over, fought with passion and force which he seldom displays. All risk of defeat faded away. Doubting members were won back. Some who in the morning had determined to vote against their party were now ready to vote with it, and others changed their opposition into less dangerous abstention. The result was that when the opposing forces streamed into the lobbies it was but a comparatively small section of the friends of India in the Conservative ranks who were found ready to risk anything for the cause, and the Government defeated the amendment with a loss of only sixty votes.

Then came another unfortunate incident. When there is an amendment to be negatived and a resolution to be carried, the issue in each case being practically the same, the House seldom goes to the trouble and waste of time of two divisions. On this occasion, as usual, the first division was accepted as deciding the matter, and the moment it was over many members hurried away just in time to catch their last train home, without waiting to hear the original resolution formally adopted. But Sir Charles Dilke and one or two of his personal following challenged a division, and, despite the warning that some scores of Liberals had gone away beyond recall, persisted in it. Their irresponsible action put the Liberal leaders in a difficulty. The moral effect of the first division was likely to be weakened by one more favourable for the Government. The only chance for the opponents of the Government was to leave the House and so destroy the moral effect of the second division by reducing it to absurd proportions. This policy was hastily adopted, but was only partially successful. The ex-ministers and many of their followers hurried to the door. Some escaped. But the bulk were too late and were shut in. The mass of members voting was reduced by nearly a quarter—from 465 to 358. But of the smaller number a much larger proportion were supporters of the Government, and it fell out that by still one more of a series of unfortunate accidents the Government appeared to carry their Resolution, without the loss of a vote, by their normal party majority of 146.

II.—IN THE LORDS.

When the resolution came on July 16th to be confirmed by the House of Lords the spectacle differed materially from that which was presented by the debate in the Commons. The House of Lords is not given to excitement; the hereditary legislators have been left untouched by the new wave of awakened interest in Indian affairs; the Government have an overwhelming majority and so ran no risk of defeat. Under these circumstances the debate was a formality, or would have been if Lord Salisbury and Lord Lansdowne had not taken advantage of the opportunity to try to improve the case for the Government by such refinements and afterthoughts of argument as the previous debates had suggested. It was to these points of the debate that the large audience of visitors listened most attentively. The Strangers' Gallery was unusually crowded, the visitors being almost without exception evidently connected with India, British officials and ex-officials being closely mingled with Indians. The Siamese Princes were in a special Gallery and there were many peeresses in the side galleries who had come to hear their husbands speak. The House of Lords is a difficult audience to address, and an uninteresting one to watch, for, partly from lack of feeling, and partly from reserve, the members hardly ever make any demonstration of approval or disapproval or show in any way what effect the successive orators are having on their minds. They did, however, give a slight indication of impatience when Lord Onslow, who had to move the Resolution, and who is not an impressive speaker, prolonged his repetition of Lord G. Hamilton's arguments to an inordinate length. It was Lord Lansdowne who really made the strong speech in defence of the Resolution, and it was the more interesting to hear him defend the charge upon India because, only a short time ago, on his return from India, he made a powerful appeal to the House to be more just and considerate to the Indian taxpayer. Another interesting feature was the interposition of the venerable Duke of Argyll, whose connexion with the Government of India dates back to a period beyond the memory of the present generation of politicians. Lord Northbrook was the only Unionist peer who spoke against the Government. Lord Kimberley, before attacking the Government, had to justify his own action in 1885, and explain why he now felt at liberty to take a different line. It was a striking feature of this debate that so many of the principles and influences involved were personified in the men actually speaking. They were the men whose personal will had decided many of the issues. The Government of India and Lord Lansdowne, the India Office and Lord Kimberley, the Home Government and Lord Salisbury are, or have been, largely interchangeable terms. The House of Lords are accustomed to this, but they experienced a novel sensation when that peculiarly impersonal and powerful department, "the Treasury," appeared in the person of Lord Welby. For many years Lord

Welby had, in the recesses of his office, held the purse-strings of the British Exchequer, and issued from thence those imperious demands or refusals to which all the governing departments bow. Lord Welby has but recently emerged from his den and taken a place as a member of the Legislature, and the Lords evidently felt there was a certain piquancy in having that dread abstraction "the Treasury" there in flesh and blood before them. This was increased by the fact that Lord Welby, in his unofficial capacity, is a political opponent of the present Government. Several references were made to his presence, Lord Salisbury in particular challenging him to explain the tenderness which he was about to show for the Indian tax-payer as contrasted with the soulless rigour "the Treasury" had always shown and is still showing. One item in Lord Salisbury's speech which was evidently the most unexpected was the revelation that he had proposed to his Cabinet to establish some tribunal of arbitration between the Indian and the Home Government, but had been overruled by his colleagues. Lord Rosebery concluded the debate with a brief but vigorous speech. In a few clear sentences he gave an uncompromising denial to the argument of the Government—sentences which pledged him to do full justice to India if he is ever again in power. About a hundred and thirty peers took part in the division. The forty who voted against the Government probably represented nearly the full number of the opponents of the resolution. The ninety-two who defeated them represented not only themselves but several hundreds of their colleagues, whom the Government can always rely on in an emergency.

III.—SUMMARY OF PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS.

In anticipation of the recent debates in both Houses of Parliament on the payment of Indian troops despatched to Suakin, two important Parliamentary papers were issued—one at the end of June, the other early in July.

The first was a Return (No. 236), moved for by Mr. John Morley, and dated India Office, June 16th, "of opinions and reasons entered in the Minutes of the Proceedings of the Secretary of State in Council, on the 16th day of May, under 21 and 22 Vict., c. 106, s. 23, with reference to the expenses of the troops to be despatched to Africa in aid of the Egyptian troops."

The second was a White-book [C.—8131] containing "Correspondence between the Government of India and the Secretary of State in Council, regarding the incidence of the cost of Indian troops when employed out of India."

We give below the substance of these documents.

"India has come into the matter accidentally."
—*Sir Donald Stewart and Sir James Peile.*

The "Return of Opinions and Reasons" contained two Minutes—the first, which was opposed to the proposals of the Government, signed by Sir J. B. Peile and Field-Marshal Sir Donald Stewart; the second, which approved the proposals of the Government, signed by Sir Alexander Arbuthnot.

Sir James Peile's and Sir Donald Stewart's Minute is important enough to be cited *in extenso*. Amid all that has been written and said on the question we shall probably look in vain for a statement at once so concise, so moderate, and so conclusive:—

"We accept the principle that India may be expected to contribute to the cost of military operations outside India, if she can be shown to have a direct and substantial interest in such operations.

"Each case must be judged on its merits in the light of this principle.

"In the present case we do not find that India has a direct and substantial interest in the recovery of the Soudan by Egypt. The Egyptian Government and the Canal were not in any danger. The case simply is that, as the power of the Mahdi and the Dervishes appears to be breaking up, the moment was thought opportune for striking a vigorous blow.

"There was no question, when the operations were commenced, whether India was so directly and specially interested in them that she ought to be a partner with England (or is it not with Egypt?) in the cost. *India has come into the matter accidentally.* It was found that the forces of Egypt did not suffice both to take the field and to hold Suakin. *If Suakin had been blessed with a good climate, no doubt English regiments would have been sent there, and, if they had, it cannot be contended that India would have been required to contribute.* But its climate is more favourable to Orientals than to Europeans, and therefore the Government of India was asked to send troops, and it cheerfully complied by selecting some of its best.

"Then arose the subject of payment, and therewith reappeared the old doctrine that India should pay the ordinary cost of the troops lent. The argument addressed to India is: you would have had to pay if the troops had not been sent, so it makes no difference. *But surely there is a great difference between paying your own men for doing your own work in your own country, and paying the same men for doing other people's work in a foreign country.* The Treasury has urged against India that, if India does not pay the ordinary charges, there will be an actual saving in the Indian Budget. But is it unreasonable that India should make a saving by not paying for what she does not get? Such arguments are to be avoided, because they force attention to the contrast between what is required of India, and the way in which England deals with India, as regards the supply of troops. If England charges India for the entire cost of the recruit from the moment when he leaves England to join the garrison of India, why should India bear the cost of the soldiery it has trained when they leave India to join the garrison at Suakin?

"It is well, therefore, to leave arguments of this kind and to return to the only true criterion, viz., whether India has such a direct, special, and substantial interest in any military operations abroad that she may reasonably be required to join in providing the cost. We consider that no such interest has been shown in this case; and, when the interest of India is questionable and open to argument, it is sound policy in the English Government to incline to the more liberal view.

"We confine our dissent to the question of payment. We entirely approve the alacrity of the Government of India in supplying the troops, and would always approve of such action."

THE SARCASM OF SIR A. ARBUTHNOT.

If anything were required to strengthen the position taken up by Sir Donald Stewart and Sir James Peile it would be supplied by Sir Alexander Arbuthnot's adverse Minute, which, with unconscious sarcasm, demolishes the case that it purports to approve. Sir Alexander writes, for example:—

"All that India is asked to do is to bear for a limited period the ordinary expenses of the Indian troops which are to be sent; all the additional charges which will be incurred being met from the British or the Egyptian treasury. The view of the majority of the Council is that it is not unreasonable, in an emergency of this nature, that India should go on paying *to the end of the present year, or for a shorter period* if the services of the Indian troops can be dispensed with at an earlier date, the ordinary charges which would have had to be met from the Indian treasury if the troops had been kept in India. *It is very generally agreed that this arrangement could not be continued for an indefinite or prolonged period,* although I consider that a good deal might be said against this view, if we are justified, as I think we are, in holding that India has a direct and substantial interest in the success of the present operations in the Sudan."

Exactly. If the arrangement temporarily proposed by the Cabinet were defensible at all, it would be defensible for a prolonged period. But, as it is, nobody pretends that the arrangement could be "continued for an indefinite or prolonged period." Its apologists fall back upon the traditional excuse for a lapse from virtue—that "it is only a little one." Sir A. Arbuthnot thus exposes, with a candour worthy of Sir John Gorst, the unreasonableness of his political associates. He adds that a specially strong point in Sir Donald Stewart's case is "the fact that the entire cost of the British troops supplied for the defence of India is defrayed from Indian revenues from the moment the troops leave England."

"This point raises the very large question of the relations between the British and Indian treasuries, and I venture to think that from this point of view there is much to be said in favour of the arrangement which my two colleagues denounce; for I cannot help hoping that the very reasonable attitude of the majority of the Council in this matter may tend to place those relations upon a better footing, and to induce some degree of reciprocity on the part of the British treasury, in the event of India in some future emergency having to apply to England for special military help."

In other words, there is at present no "degree of reciprocity on the part of the British Treasury," but Sir Alexander Arbuthnot hopes that, as India has been compelled to do something which she could not justly be required to do, the Treasury may behave less unfairly in future. Whether this hope is, or is not, too sanguine, we need not pause to enquire. But it supplies, to say the least, a curious ground for the contention that the present demand upon India is just. The richest passage in Sir A. Arbuthnot's Minute is, however, the last:—

"I will only add that on general grounds I regard the employment of Indian troops upon a duty of this nature as highly conducive to the interests of the Empire, as well from an Indian as from an Imperial point of view. Such an employment fosters that most valuable sentiment of solidarity between our British and our Indian troops, and it tends to raise our military prestige in the eyes of other nations."

Under all the circumstances this reference to the "valuable sentiment of solidarity" is, in its way, a triumph.

THE HISTORY OF THE LOANS.

We turn now to the White-book, containing the correspondence, and it may be convenient to preface our summary of it with a tabular statement showing the various occasions upon which England has borrowed troops from India.

Year.	Purpose.	Prime Minister.	Payment by India.
1859-60	China Expedition ...	Lord Palmerston ...	*Nil.*
1860-61	New Zealand	Lord Palmerston ...	Ordinary expenses
1867	Abyssinian Expedition	Lord Derby ...	Ordinary expenses
1875	Perak Expedition ...	Mr. Disraeli ...	Ordinary expenses
1878	Malta	Lord Beaconsfield	*Nil.*
1878	Afghan War	Lord Beaconsfield	Whole expenditure *less* 5 millions
1882	Egypt	Mr. Gladstone ...	Whole expenditure *less* £500,000
1885	Sudan Expedition ...	Mr. Gladstone ...	Ordinary expenses
1896 (Mar.)	Mombasa	Lord Salisbury ...	*Nil.*
1896 (May)	Suakin	Lord Salisbury ...	Ordinary expenses

THE RECENT WHITE-BOOK.

The White-book containing "Correspondence between the Government of India and the Secretary of State in Council" falls naturally into three parts, as follows:—

(i) Correspondence regarding the Sudan Expedition in 1885 (pp. 3-12);

(ii) Correspondence regarding Mombasa, 1896 (pp. 13-16);

(iii) Correspondence regarding the Sudan, 1896 (pp. 16-33).

And, whatever may have been the purpose with which the White-book was compiled in this way, the result is excellent. For, while the correspondence relating to 1885 concluded with some notable admissions on the part of the India Office and the Treasury, the correspondence relating to Mombasa affords an unanswerable case against the proposals agreed to by Lord George Hamilton with reference to the Sudan.

THE "PRECEDENT" OF 1885.

The first part of the correspondence may be briefly described. In February, 1885, Lord Kimberley telegraphed to the Viceroy that the Home Government would bear the additional expense—in other words, that India must bear the ordinary expense—of the Indian troops despatched to Suakin. The Government of India, in a despatch dated February, 17th, 1885, and referring back to its despatch of August 4th, 1882, protested against the charge in terms which have a direct bearing upon the present question:—

"Whatever may be the view taken with regard to former precedents, we are quite content that the present case should also be judged upon its merits, considering, as we do, that it is beyond all question one in which no part of the expenditure incurred, whether additional or otherwise, should be charged to Indian revenues. There is no question now of the safety of

the Suez Canal, which was urged in 1882 as a reason why the Indian Government should bear its share in the expenditure then to be incurred. The operations taking place in the Sudan have no connexion with any Indian interests, and lie altogether outside the sphere of our responsibilities. We can look for neither advantage nor loss from them. The pretensions and the aims of the leaders of the rising in Africa are a matter of indifference to the Government of India, which is in no way interested in disputing or putting down by force the claims of political or religious pretenders in regions of the world remote from its own limits and from those of its neighbours. We should, indeed, on these grounds, be justified in strongly opposing the employment of Indian troops on the present occasion; but, while we are not in a position to refuse the assistance which is now asked of us, we cannot allow that our assent should be supposed to imply a readiness on our part to defray any portion whatever, whether ordinary or additional, of the charges which our assistance will entail."

The Government of India added a general caution which is certainly not less apposite to-day:

"We are further deeply impressed with the conviction that no better check could be placed on the inconvenience and danger arising from the employment of Indian troops outside the sphere of Indian interests, than by insisting on the principle that, in cases such as the present, her Majesty's Government should admit and discharge the obligation of defraying all expenditure necessitated by a course of action which has no bearing upon those interests. The disposal of Indian revenues for other purposes than those which are strictly connected with the legitimate needs of Indian expenditure is a matter which is watched with increasing concern by all sections of the community in this country."

To this despatch Lord Kimberley replied that the resolution authorising the charge upon India had been adopted in the House of Commons *before the despatch was received!* He enclosed the correspondence which had passed between the Treasury and the India Office, and which, by the way, illustrates one of the most interesting points established by the correspondence as a whole—namely, that in these transactions a good deal depends upon the personal strength or compliance of the Secretary of State for India. In this case the Treasury had suggested that the ordinary expenses of the borrowed troops should be borne by India, and two days later Lord Kimberley, apparently without demur, accepted the proposal.

In a later despatch, dated February 9th, 1886, the Government of India argued that the circumstances of the case had changed since the previous March, and that the ordinary expenses of the troops should, at any rate, no longer continue to be borne by India. From the date on which the bulk of the British troops were withdrawn the Government of India considered that "the object and character of the expedition were entirely changed," and that the case of the Indian troops left in Suakin as a garrison could hardly be said to be covered by the letter of the authorising resolution, and certainly did not fall within its spirit. On these grounds the Government of India suggested that India should be relieved from payment with effect from May 15th, 1885—the date on which active operations were held to have ceased.

Lord Cross's Legacy.

Lord Kimberley's reply was eminently characteristic. It was that the Indian garrison at Suakin was under existing arrangements to be relieved early in May, 1886; that if the withdrawal took place at that date it would be "undesirable to raise any question with the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury"; but that if the withdrawal were postponed beyond that date a representation should be made "with a view to the ordinary cost being added to the expenses now borne by the British revenues, so that no part of the cost may thenceforward fall on Indian revenues."

This reply was, of course, as illogical as Sir A. Arbuthnot's admission cited above, and the Government of India, in a spirited rejoinder, easily demolished it:

"In our financial letter of the 9th February, 1886, No. 53, we explained why we considered that India should be relieved of the ordinary cost of the Indian troops and vessels employed in connexion with the garrisoning of Suakin, with effect from the 15th May, 1885. No reason has been assigned for the rejection of our claim, and Lord Kimberley has, we submit, practically admitted its validity, by allowing that, if there was any further detention of Indian troops at Suakin, the Treasury should be asked to consent to the ordinary cost of these troops being also borne by Imperial revenues. In effect our claim would appear to be fully as equitable for the period between May, 1885, and May, 1886, as it would be for any subsequent period."

Unfortunately Lord Kimberley was never required to deal with this reply. A change of Government had, in the meantime, placed Lord Cross at the India Office. But Lord Cross did the next best thing to accepting the Government of India's contention. He virtually promised that the unfairness should not be repeated. Writing to the Viceroy on February 3rd, 1887, he said:

"While I was not prepared to support the proposal of your Government, I deemed it right that the Treasury should be made acquainted with your Excellency's view; and I took the opportunity to urge on them that, in the event of any occasion hereafter arising for the employment of Indian troops on duties not directly attributable to the requirements of your Government or at a distance from India, no portion of the expense should be charged against India without your Excellency's concurrence."

What Lord Cross actually wrote to the Treasury was:

"The Secretary of State for India in Council feels that there is much force in the general scope of the arguments of the Government of India, and desires to take this opportunity of expressing his earnest hope that on any future occasion, when Indian troops are employed on duties not directly attributable to the requirements of the Government of India or despatched to a country distant from India, no portion of the expenses of such troops may be charged to India without the full assent and concurrence of the Government of that country."

And the Treasury replied:—

"Their lordships make no doubt that, should the occasion again arise for employing Indian troops outside India, the views of the present Government of India and of the present Secretary of State for India in Council on the question of the expense of such employment will be respectfully weighed by the Imperial Government of the day."

Such was the legacy bequeathed by the transactions of 1885.

The Case of Mombasa.

We pass now to the second part of the correspondence. Here the point is that Lord George Hamilton repudiated last February a claim admittedly stronger than that which he acceded to in May.

On February 20th, 1896, Lord Salisbury wrote from the Foreign Office asking whether the Government of India could send a regiment from Bombay

to Mombasa, as "the state of affairs" in British East Africa had "recently assumed a serious aspect." "The expenses," he added, "which might be incurred would be borne by her Majesty's Government."

On the following day Lord Salisbury, repenting this equitable undertaking, wrote that "it is *presumed* that the precedents *could* be followed of former employment of Indian troops in Africa"—namely, that India should pay the ordinary expenses. The words we have italicised are interesting, especially as Lord Salisbury's second thoughts were evidently inspired by the Treasury. For the letter concluded: "His Lordship would be glad to learn *whether the Treasury could be informed* that a similar arrangement would be adopted" in the case of Mombasa.

Lord George Hamilton's reply to this ungenerous afterthought was admirable—so admirable as to supply an instructive commentary upon his later compliance in the case of the troops despatched to Suakin. The Under Secretary for India wrote to the Foreign Office on February 27th:—

"In reply, I am to express Lord George Hamilton's opinion that there is no justification for charging upon Indian revenues any portion of the cost of this force so long as it is employed out of India and for purposes exclusively Imperial. In a letter dated the 25th of March, 1890, the Government of India lays down as a principle that, when circumstances and the safety of India permit, aid should be freely given to the Imperial Government; but that, when the objects of the expedition or campaign are unconnected with India, the whole of the expenses of the troops drawn from India should be paid by the Imperial exchequer, just as the whole of the expenses of the troops drawn from England for an Indian expedition would be paid by Indian revenues. It appears to his lordship that this principle is sound, and that, if the course suggested in your letter were adopted, the result would be that the cost of the operations would in effect be shared between India and the United Kingdom."

"A Stronger Claim."

It is noteworthy that the reply to this letter came, not from the Foreign Office, but from the Treasury. It was a financier's endeavour—characterised by a wealth of misplaced ingenuity—to show, in the interests of his accounts, that the objects for which an Indian regiment was required in East Africa were really "connected with India." The trade of Zanzibar, the construction of the Uganda Railway by Indian coolies, the chance of Indian trade with the interior, and, as a matter of course, "prestige with the Arab races and Muhammadan tribes," all were pressed indifferently into the service of a hopeless theory. But Sir Francis Mowatt's letter contained one important paragraph which it is worth while to cite in full:—

"*It seems to my lords that a stronger claim can be made out in the present case for the retention of the charge for ordinary pay and allowances of the regiment upon Indian funds than existed in the case of either the Abyssinian war of* 1867 *or the Sudan expedition of* 1885. In both the latter cases the Secretary of State for India in Council agreed to pay the ordinary charges of unreplaced Indian troops without demur. No specific grounds for consent were given in either case. It was taken for granted that India was largely interested in those regions, not so much commercially as in regard to prestige with the Arab races and Muhammadan tribes. In the present case, over and above the latter consideration, it seems to my lords that Indian commercial interests are very largely involved."

Yet although the Treasury described its claim in the case of Mombasa as stronger than the precedent of 1885, Lord G. Hamilton stood firm and dismissed it. His reply contained some reflections and comparisons which may well be placed on record:—

"It is urged that such a course [*i.e.*, to charge the ordinary expenses upon India] would be in accordance with the precedents of the Abyssinian Expedition of 1867 and the Egyptian Expedition of 1885, and that Indian interests are closely involved in the maintenance of peace on the coast of East Africa. On this point I am desired to observe that great objection has been taken by the Government of India to any extension of the principle adopted on those occasions, and to the absence of reciprocity in such arrangements. It cannot be disputed that Imperial interests are largely involved in the maintenance of peace on the frontiers of India, and in the security of the trade in that country, yet, when it has been necessary to obtain fresh troops from the United Kingdom, their ordinary pay has been borne by the revenues of India from the day of their embarkation from England. Lord George Hamilton is unable to admit that there is any more ground for debiting to India a portion of the expenses of troops sent for special service in the East Africa Protectorate than of those raised in India for ordinary service in that Protectorate."

And again:—

"In your letter much stress is laid on the Consular reports and statistics of Zanzibar as showing that the expedition is 'connected with India.' With much greater force could it be shown that British interests are connected with the trade of India, but, as already observed, no assistance is given by the Exchequer of the United Kingdom in defraying the charges of the military force in India."

Still the Treasury was not satisfied, but on April 29th made a further representation to Lord George Hamilton, consisting of wire-drawn arguments. The value of Lord George Hamilton's rejoinder lies in his destruction of the propositions (*a*) that India contributes too little to the navy, and (*b*) that it is fair to charge India with the ordinary expenses of borrowed troops because, if the troops were not borrowed, their expenses would fall upon India:—

"As regards your remarks on the question of reciprocity, Lord George Hamilton does not wish to enter into that controversy. He cannot, however, admit that, in regard to naval defence, India is under any special obligation because the protection of the general trade of the United Kingdom in Eastern seas is undertaken by the Admiralty at the cost of Imperial revenues; or that, in the great crisis of the maintenance of British supremacy in India, an undue amount of the charge was thrown upon the United Kingdom, since India, besides bearing the whole cost of the extra force, from the date of embarkation, paid also the charges in England of the depôts of the regiments sent to India, in addition to the burden of interest resulting from an augmentation of her debt by forty-six millions.

"On the argument that troops lent, and not replaced, can continue to be paid for by India without adding to her burdens, I am to point out that the work of the army must necessarily be performed by a smaller force than is deemed requisite, thereby entailing a risk, even if it be not shown in a financial aspect, and that India would be confessedly paying for the employment of a force beyond her own frontiers from which she derives no benefit."

It would seem that Lord George Hamilton overlooked this reply when he came to deal with the Sudan question. Indeed, his whole attitude towards the Treasury in the Mombasa case makes his subsequent surrender quite inexplicable on any considerations which a Secretary of State for India—member of the Cabinet though he is—is supposed to admit.

"A Masterpiece of Melancholy Meanness.

We come now to the third part of the correspondence—that, namely, which contains the history

of the Home Government's "melancholy meanness" in the case of Suakin. As this matter is discussed at some length on another page, we confine ourselves here to a summary of the documents. It was on May 5th that Lord George Hamilton telegraphed to Lord Elgin that "her Majesty's Government would probably send demand for Indian troops to garrison Suakin in a few days." Two days later Lord George Hamilton telegraphed particulars of the force which "the Egyptian authorities demand." (The repeated use of this phrase is, by the way, a significant commentary upon the later suggestion that India was really co-operating in an expedition closely allied with Indian interests.) The Viceroy replied at once that some of the best Indian troops should be sent, and, on May 8th, added:

"We assume that no portion of the expenses, either ordinary or extraordinary, will be borne by Indian revenues, and entirely concur with views expressed in India Office Letter to the Treasury, dated 15th April, subject, Cost of Native Regiment, Mombasa."

This rather neat reference to the Mombasa case failed in its purpose. On May 9th Lord George Hamilton telegraphed to Lord Elgin:

"As regards cost, Treasury here propose to pay whole cost of battalion at Mombasa, and for these troops to follow precedent of 1884, by which India paid ordinary, and Imperial all extra, expenditure. This seems to me fair, but subject will be discussed in Council here, where views of your Government will be fully considered."

This telegram is one of the most remarkable documents in the White-book. It is to be noted:

(i) That the Treasury again appears as the author of the financial proposal;
(ii) That Lord George Hamilton, instead of resisting the proposal as he did in the case of Mombasa, had already made up his mind that the charge upon India was fair;
(iii) That Lord George Hamilton appears to associate the Mombasa loan with the Suakin loan, and, by a sort of "reduction on taking a quantity," to agree that if the Home Government paid in one case, India might fairly be charged in the other case;
(iv) That Lord George Hamilton nevertheless promised "full consideration" of the views of the Government of India—a promise which was not fulfilled, as he gave notice of the authorising resolution in the House of Commons before the despatch of the Government of India had left India.

Lord Elgin's Telegram.

On May 12th Lord George Hamilton telegraphed to the Viceroy that an early decision in London was "very desirable as to the cost of the troops sent to Suakin," and requested the Government of India to send the substance of its views by telegram. In reply the Government of India telegraphed as follows, under date May 14th:

"We are unanimously of opinion that Indian interests are not involved in present military operations in Egypt, and respectfully protest against Indian revenues being used to defray any of the expenses of Indian contingent under orders for Suakin. As pointed out in India Office Letter of 15th April to Treasury, we have grave objection to precedent of Suakin expedition, 1885, being followed, and to absence of reciprocity in such arrangements between England and India. We commend to your attention specially our Financial Despatch, No. 53, of 17th February, 1885, to Lord Kimberley. The argument that some ordinary expenditure might be saved to Indian revenues by payment from other sources for troops absent from India (see Treasury Letter of 27th February, 1885) leaves out of sight the fact that while troops are absent they are not available for our needs. Our army is scarcely sufficient for our own purposes, and in now complying with Imperial requirements we undertake the risk of an emergency coming upon us while our army is reduced below the recognised minimum. If her Majesty's Government add to our responsibilities by calling upon India for native troops to serve at an unhealthy station like Suakin in the worst season in order to avoid risk of sending troops from England, we strongly urge that they should not at the same time make India pay for native troops while not available for Indian needs. When British troops are required for India, Indian revenues are charged with whole cost from date of embarkation to date of return, and India bears expense of raising and training troops sent annually to this country. In the present case it is not desired to make any charge for cost of raising and training troops which have been placed at disposal of her Majesty's Government. Despatch follows."

"After Full Discussion"!

Lord George Hamilton, as we have seen, had promised that the views of the Government of India should be "fully considered." Yet on the day after the receipt of the Viceroy's telegram he telegraphed in reply:—

"After full discussion and consideration of your telegraphic summary, Council are of opinion that precedent of 1885 is applicable to cost of expedition to Suakin, and have resolved accordingly."

In reply to a further request that final decision should be postponed until the despatch had been received, Lord G. Hamilton replied that it was impossible. On June 2nd, however—after the inconvenient disclosures of the Italian Green-books—he changed his mind, and, although the authorising resolution had already been placed on the Order Book of the House of Commons, the debate was postponed until after the receipt of the Government of India's despatch, dated June 2nd.

Lord Elgin's Despatch.

This masterly document, which fills some ten pages of the White-book, does the greatest credit to its authors, and has doubtless helped in no small degree to produce the present state of feeling in England—which, as we remark elsewhere, promises to prevent any future recurrence of the "melancholy meanness" now perpetrated.

The despatch opens with a *résumé* of the proceedings which we have summarised above. Then follows a survey of the occasions upon which Indian troops have been employed "outside Indian limits on duties not directly connected with the interests of India," the Government of India having "consistently opposed the appropriation of Indian revenues for these purposes." There is a long quotation from Lord Ripon's famous despatch of August 4th, 1882, which referred, *inter alia*, to the debate on the Abyssinian Expedition in 1867, and the Protests of Mr. Fawcett and Lord Salisbury (then Lord Cranborne).

India and Egypt.

Passing on to the Egyptian Expedition of 1882, Lord Elgin's despatch gives a valuable summary of the objections then urged by the Government of

India. This summary is so apposite to the recent discussion that it may well be given here in full:—

"(*a*) That the interests of India were not involved to such an extent in the maintenance of the established rights, either of the Sultan, or of the Khedive, or of the people of Egypt, or of the foreign bondholders, as to justify, so far as those interests only were concerned, a resort to arms, and, in consequence, the expenditure of large sums of money which must be borne by the Indian taxpaying community. The Government of India considered that, so long as Egyptian policy was regarded as a matter of Imperial concern, and they were required to lend temporarily, and conditionally on the cost being borne by the English Treasury, whatever military aid could, without detriment to Indian interests, be afforded to give effect to the policy of her Majesty's Government, consultation with them was unnecessary. But, if any part of the expenditure thus involved was to be borne by Indian revenues, they claimed to express their opinion freely, before any such charge was laid upon India, as they could scarcely conceive any subject upon which the Government of India, as representing the people of this country, could have a clearer or better claim to be heard. And, while recognising the security which has been provided by the legislature against any appropriation of the Indian revenues being made without a full consideration of Indian interests, they submitted 'that before Parliament is called to deliberate on a question of this importance, it would be advisable that it should be placed in possession of the opinions of the Government of India, and should have an opportunity of learning any objections which that Government may entertain to Indian revenues being made to bear all the charges on account of an expedition carried on beyond the frontiers of her Majesty's Indian possessions.'

"(*b*) That the sole material interest which India possessed in Egypt was, that the transit of ships through the Suez Canal should be assured. The statistical information at the disposal of the Government of India did not enable them accurately to apportion between England and India the extent to which either country was interested in the Suez Canal. It was, however, quite certain that the interest of England was far greater than that of India; for not only was all, or very nearly all, the shipping under the British flag passing through the Canal owned by her Majesty's British subjects, but also England was at least as much interested as India in the British-Indian trade; whilst the remaining trade from England to the East, as well as the trade from foreign countries to British Colonies in the East, constituted a wholly British interest. While readily admitting that India was more interested in the Suez Canal than Ceylon, the Straits Settlements, Hong Kong, the Australian Colonies, Tasmania, or New Zealand, and, indeed, that the Indian interest in the Canal was greater than that of all those Colonies taken together, the Government of India failed to understand on what principle of political equity India could be called upon to defray any part of the cost of the armed intervention in Egypt, unless the Australian and other colonies were called upon to pay their proportionate share.

"(*c*) That the proposal was likely to exercise an injurious effect upon the political connection between England and India. The Government of India considered that, if the lesson were once learnt that, a war having been commenced in which large English and relatively small Indian interests were involved, a considerable portion of the cost of that war might, nevertheless, be readily thrown upon the Indian taxpayers, a strong temptation would arise to revert to this procedure and that thus the political connection between India and England would be subject to a severe strain. That any such tendency as that alluded to should gain ground in England would, the Government of India thought, be inconsistent with those high principles by which they felt assured her Majesty's Government would wish the political action of England to be guided. From the Indian point of view, the baneful effect of any such tendency was so obvious as scarcely to require indication; and the Government of India could conceive nothing which was more likely to alienate from them the feelings of the natives of this country than that it should be thought that the action of her Majesty's Government, even though approved by Parliament, did not partake of a beneficent nature, but was rather directed towards imposing burdens on the Indian taxpayers, with a view to reducing those which might more properly be borne by the taxpayers of the United Kingdom. The Government of India believed that at no period of Indian history had the natives of India been more contented and more loyally disposed towards the rule of her Majesty the Queen Empress than then; and that at no time had the satisfactory signs of moral and material progress been more prominent. They therefore most earnestly deprecated the proposed measure as being calculated to check the current of that contentment, loyalty, and progress. They pointed out that the taxpaying community of England is among the wealthiest, whilst that of India is among the poorest, in the world; and that it could not, surely, be in consonance with justice or sound Imperial policy that the wealthy and dominant race should relieve itself of charges at the expense of the poor and subject race, if the smallest doubt could be thrown on the equity of such a proceeding."

THE QUESTION OF "SAVING MONEY."

Then comes the "precedent" of 1885, which we have already summarised above. We may cite here the observations of the Government of India on the precious plea that as India pays the expenses of her troops when they are not borrowed she is fairly required to pay those expenses when the troops are borrowed:—

"In his letter of the 27th February, 1885, the Secretary to the Treasury remarked that, 'as my lords understand the proposed arrangement, there is no desire, on the part of the Indian Government, to save money by means of the expedition.' The Lords Commissioners of the Treasury, in putting forward this plea, seemed to have overlooked what took place in the case of the Mutiny of 1857. As Lord Lawrence pointed out in his Minute of the 20th January, 1868 (quoted in paragraph 5, Government of India Financial Despatch, No. 239, dated 4th August, 1882): 'All the troops and all the material which were sent from England to aid in putting down the Mutiny in 1857 and 1858 were paid for out of Indian revenues. It was never urged that, because this measure afforded a temporary relief to the British exchequer, a portion of the ordinary cost of these troops should be paid by England. It is true that England had to raise more troops in the place of those supplied to India on that occasion, but not at all to the extent of those which were sent out to this country.' India also paid for the large depôts which were established in England at that time (some 19,000 strong), and which were maintained after the emergency had passed away. England, therefore, saved money by the supply of troops to India, although there can be no question that the Imperial interests of England were deeply and directly concerned in the suppression of the Mutiny, while, on the other hand, India is not interested in the present operations in the Sudan."

"THE ARRANGEMENT NOW PROPOSED."

Passing on, the Government of India calls attention to what we have described above as "Lord Cross's Legacy," and to Lord George Hamilton's admirable demolition of the "stronger claim of the Treasury in the Mombasa case. "We heartily recognise," write Lord Elgin and his colleagues, "the support thus accorded to our Government, and would express our full concurrence in the views held by your lordship, more especially in regard to the absence of reciprocity in such arrangements." But Lord G. Hamilton's attitude on that occasion only made it more "difficult to understand why the principles therein accepted, and for which we have been so long contending, should now be at once departed from in the case of the Indian troops proceeding to Suakin." Then, after a very just complaint as to the manner in which its claims and arguments had been met, the Government of India concluded its despatch as follows:—

"To the arrangement now proposed, we must, as we did in 1885, most strongly demur. The operations now taking place

in the Sudan lie altogether outside the sphere of our responsibilities. So far as we are acquainted with the policy and intentions of Her Majesty's Government, as they appear from the ministerial statements in Parliament, the present expedition on the Nile was determined upon to repel a possible advance of Dervish troops in the Nile valley or against Tokar and Suakin, and to act as a diversion for the help and for the relief of the Italians at Kassala. His Highness the Khedive, according to the statement made by the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on the 30th March in the House of Commons, informed the Sultan that the British and Egyptian Governments had agreed that the moment was opportune for endeavouring to bring back Dongola, which is part of a province formerly held by Egypt in the Sudan, under Egyptian administration. In order to strengthen Suakin, and to set free Egyptian troops for employment on the Nile, we have been asked to provide a garrison composed of troops from the native army in India. We cannot perceive any Indian interests, however remote, which are involved in carrying out the policy above described; it cannot be alleged that the safety of the Suez Canal is involved; and the taxpayers of India, who have to bear the cost of the ordinary charges of the Indian troops proceeding to Suakin, will hardly comprehend the reasons for taxing them for troops which are not serving in India, in order to maintain order on the Egyptian frontier, to reconquer part of an Egyptian province, or to assist the Italian forces. The objections which we urged in 1885 against Indian revenues being burdened with any portion of the expenditure caused by the expedition to the Sudan, which was undertaken that year, apply with equal force to the present occasion; and, as it would appear from the subsequent correspondence on the subject referred to in paragraphs 10-14 of this despatch, that our representations did appeal in a sensible degree to both Lord Kimberley and Lord Cross, we may be permitted to think that our views might also have influenced the resolution passed in Parliament in 1885 had the despatch containing them been laid before it in time for consideration.

"We would point out that her Majesty's Government add to our responsibilities by calling upon us to furnish Indian troops for service at an unhealthy station like Suakin, in the worst season of the year, in order to avoid the risk involved in sending troops for the purpose from England; during the absence of those troops we have to govern India with an army smaller than our needs impose upon us, and we cannot too strongly urge therefore, that, whilst our responsibilities are thus increased, India should not at the same time be called upon to pay for troops not available for Indian needs. India has already borne the expense of raising and training troops now placed at the disposal of her Majesty's Government; and we consider that this advantage, for which we do not propose to charge the Imperial Government, is the only concession which should be allowed at the expense of Indian revenues.

"We have already adverted in this despatch to the opinions of the Government of India previously recorded, showing that the imposition on Indian revenues of burdens for services in which India is in no way interested would be an impolitic course to adopt. We would add that, since the passing of the Indian Councils Act of 1892, the annual Financial Statement of the Governor-General in Council comes under discussion in the Legislative Council of the Governor-General; and, from the discussions which have since taken place, it will be seen that the finances are watched and scrutinized, and their utilisation for purposes which are viewed as illegitimate, or unauthorised, is vigorously challenged. So far as we are able to judge from ordinary sources of information, public opinion in this country is practically unanimous on this question.

"In these circumstances we feel it our duty, in the interests of the country of which the administration is entrusted to us, to protest once more in the strongest terms against a policy which burdens Indian revenues with expenditure connected with services in which India has no interest; which is unjust to India, because it applies, to the payment of Indian troops lent to England, a different principle from that which England imposes when English troops are lent to India; and which is inexpedient, because it exposes our Government to attacks to which there is no adequate answer. We ask that the principles for which we have all along contended may be accepted and strictly applied, and that in accordance with those principles Indian revenues may be relieved of all expenditure connected with the Indian troops now proceeding to Suakin. We would therefore request that this despatch may now be laid before her Majesty's Government, with a view to the decision already given in the present case being reconsidered, and we trust that your lordship will be pleased to accord to our representations your fullest support."

Lord G. Hamilton's Reply.

The following is the text of Lord G. Hamilton's reply, dated June 30th :—

"My Lord,—I have received, and have carefully considered in Council, your Excellency's telegrams of the 14th of May and 1st of June, and your letter of the 2nd of June, No. 134, in which you deal with the incidence of the cost of the expedition to Suakin.

"2. It is impossible to say that the decisions which have been arrived at on previous occasions with regard to the distribution of charge for troops lent by India to Great Britain, or by Great Britain to India, are such that any very clear or definite doctrine can be drawn from them. But, speaking generally, it may be said that the following principles have latterly been recognised, and are in accordance with the spirit of justice and equity which should govern the relations between the two Governments.

"3. In the first place, it may be laid down that on all occasions when the temporary loan of a military force is urgently required, either by Great Britain or by India, such assistance will be promptly given, so far as the ability, resources, and situation of either country at the time may permit.

"4. In the next place, it would seem to be established that, if the object for which such assistance is required is one in which the Government supplying the troops has no special interest beyond that which must be common to all members of the Empire, the whole cost of the force, so long as it is required, including both ordinary and extraordinary charges, must be borne by the Government that needs its assistance.

"5. In the third place, if the circumstances are such that the Government supplying the troops has a distinct and special interest in the matter at stake, then, although that interest may be less strong than that of the Government requiring assistance, the Government supplying the troops should be content to bear, in one form or another, a portion of the burden which the operations involve. For instance, it might in this case recognise its interest in the matter by dispensing for a time with their services at home, while retaining them, as usual, in its pay.

"6. I believe that these principles will command a general assent. The difficulty lies in their application to each case as it arises; and I proceed to state the reasons which have led her Majesty's Government to decide, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State for India in Council, that, while Great Britain bears the whole charge, ordinary and extraordinary, of the force recently sent from India to Mombasa, the extraordinary charges only of the Suakin force shall be recovered from the treasury chest.

"7. It is unnecessary, for the present purpose, to enter upon a discussion of the objects of the military operations of which the Suakin Expedition forms a part, inasmuch as it has been publicly stated on behalf of her Majesty's Government, that among them is the maintenance and development of orderly and settled government in Egypt.

"8. The Government of India has no greater interest than the maintenance of rapid and secure transit, in times of peace and of war alike, whether for commercial or for military purposes, between India and the United Kingdom. This is true of India in a sense in which it is true of no other great dependency of the British Empire; for it is upon Great Britain that India relies for the recruitment of the most important (though not the most numerous) part of its civil and military establishments, for army reliefs, for Government stores of all kinds, and, in short, for a large and essential portion of the machinery of administration and defence. It is, therefore, obvious that, apart from all considerations of trade, the preservation of free communication by the shortest route with a country on which she is so largely dependent, is to India a matter of vital importance.

"9. It is equally manifest that, for this purpose, the maintenance in Egypt of a settled and orderly government, in

friendly relations with the British Empire, is an indispensable condition; and that the measures now in progress on the Egyptian frontier must be regarded as an integral part of the policy entailed upon her Majesty's Government by the actual situation of affairs in that country. Assuming these statements to be incontrovertible as matters of fact, I cannot draw from them any other conclusion than that India has a material and special interest in supporting that policy, and in the success of the present operations.

"10. For this important object, then, India is not asked to incur the smallest additional expenditure or to impose the slightest extra taxation. The only sacrifice which she is asked to make for a cause in which she is so deeply concerned is to take the risk (such as it is) of dispensing for a short time with the services of about 2,500 troops out of the army, European and native, numbering in all about 225,000, which she keeps in her pay.

"11. I have no wish to make light of this demand. It is perfectly true that the strength of the Indian army has been fixed at what is no more than necessary to meet certain emergencies which may suddenly arise. The weakening of that army, in however small a degree, by sending a portion of it out of the country, is in itself an undesirable step, not to be assented to without good reason. But this is a risk which must be taken into account by every Government whenever a military expedition has to be sent beyond its own frontiers; it has indeed been frequently undertaken by the Government of India; and any argument founded on this consideration, even if it had greater force than I can attach to it, can have little or no bearing on the question of the allotment of charges. Looking to the general condition of affairs in India and elsewhere, to the comparatively small size of the Suakin force, and to the fact that the purpose for which it is required is strictly temporary, I say with confidence that the risk is one which, in the circumstances, India may not unreasonably be asked to incur.

"12. This, then, is the measure of India's contribution towards the object in view. There is no question of her incurring any pecuniary burden. The only effect of the recent decision, so far as she is concerned, is that 2,590 soldiers, who would otherwise, by their presence in India, have been increasing to some small extent the security of her Majesty's Indian possessions, will, instead, be actively engaged for a few months in promoting Indian, as well as British, interests by their presence elsewhere.

"13. I desire to call your Excellency's attention to the fact that I have throughout dwelt upon the temporary nature of this assistance as an essential condition of the arrangement to which I have agreed. As you will perceive from the correspondence which I enclose, this arrangement holds good only till the 31st December, if the force should be required so long. If, on the other hand, the Indian troops remain longer at Suakin, undoubtedly the question of charging India with any portion of their expenses will again be most carefully considered. And I may also observe that if the force were not, as it is, a small one, the proposed distribution of cost would have been impossible; for, if the period had been of indefinite length, or if the Indian establishment had been materially reduced, it would in either case have been necessary to raise a force to replace that which has been lent; and in that event the situation would obviously be entirely changed. There is, therefore, no fear that India will be permanently weakened by measures of this kind, or that she will come to be regarded as a source from which troops can be drawn, at small expense, for purposes wholly or mainly British. The precedent now created can only apply to loans of small bodies of troops, for short periods, and for purposes in which India has a substantial interest.

"14. This being so, it appears hardly necessary to point out that there is no analogy between the arrangement under discussion and that which exists for the supply of a permanent European force in India. In this latter case, the only alternative would be the revival of the system which formerly prevailed, viz., the maintenance in India of a special force, recruited in England, the whole charge for which, including the cost of recruitment, training, and pensions, would necessarily fall on Indian revenues. It is therefore only reasonable that India should, as stated in your telegram of 14th May, bear the whole charge, from the date of embarkation to that of return of the European force which for her own purposes she permanently requires; but the temporary loan of a small force for a definite object of common interest is a wholly different matter.

"15. Your Excellency has not failed to observe that, on the occasion of the recent despatch of a force to Mombasa, I represented to the Treasury that the preservation of order in that district was an object in which India had no special interest, and that it was accordingly right that the whole cost of the expeditionary force should be borne by the United Kingdom. To this representation the Treasury, as you will gather from the correspondence which I enclose, have agreed. This is sufficient to show that her Majesty's Government have no wish whatever to depart from the principles which I have stated in the earlier part of this despatch. But, as regards the Suakin expedition, after careful consideration in Council, it appeared to me wholly impossible to maintain that India had not a special interest in the success of the Egyptian operations. I came, therefore, with much reluctance, to the conclusion that I was unable to support your Excellency's view of which I was already fully aware.

"16. In conclusion, I desire to refer to the opinion which you express, that your Government had not sufficient opportunity of stating its views before my decision was arrived at. I much regret that you should consider that you have any cause of complaint in this respect; but I cannot admit that any undue haste was used, or that I had not before me full materials for a decision. In my telegram of the 12th of May I had informed you that an early decision was very desirable, and that I wished to be put in possession of the substance of your views by telegraph. In reply I received your telegram of the 14th May, which must have been sent with the knowledge that on its receipt the matter would probably be decided. I think, therefore, that I was justified in assuming that it contained all that you considered material for enabling me to appreciate your view of the case. And as regards the correspondence of 1882, to which your refer, I may remind you that on that occasion the circumstances closely resembled those which now exist. Then, as now, the assistance of India was required to avert a danger which threatened the cause of order and good government in Egypt; and the distribution of cost which the Government of India then recommended was identical with that on which her Majesty's Government have decided in the present case.

"17. It is a matter of much concern to me to find myself, on a matter of this kind, unable to concur in your Excellency's opinion. But, in view of the considerations which I have put before you, I am not without hope that your lordship's Government may be disposed to admit the justice of the decision at which, after full deliberation, her Majesty's Government have arrived."

"ACKNOWLEDGED WITH THANKS."

We discuss Lord G. Hamilton's reply elsewhere. It only remains to add here that the present arrangement is to continue "until the end of the current calendar year," and that the Treasury "acknowledged with thanks" the decision of the Secretary of State for India in Council.

IV.—OPINIONS OF THE PRESS.

A CHORUS OF CONDEMNATION.

It would be easy to fill the whole of the present number of "INDIA" with extracts from the Press of the United Kingdom in condemnation of the policy adopted by Lord Salisbury's Government in charging upon the revenues of India the ordinary expenses of the Indian troops despatched to Suakin.

It is impossible, however, to do more than quote from some of the leading journals on either side of politics. Nothing is more remarkable, or more full of promise for the future, than the vehemence with which the leading organs of public opinion,

without distinction of political party, have raised a chorus of condemnation of the policy of "melancholy meanness."

We may add that three daily newspapers in particular have distinguished themselves by the zeal, the thoroughness, and the admirable persistence of their opposition to the Government's policy—namely, the *Times*, the *Daily News*, and the *Manchester Guardian*. Day after day, and week after week, these journals have kept the subject prominently before their readers since the proposal to lay a charge upon India was first hinted at.

Penny-Wise, Pound-Foolish.—*Times.*

"We deeply regret that the Imperial Government have thought fit to overrule the energetic protest of the Viceroy and his Council against the decision to make the Indian Exchequer liable for the ordinary pay and maintenance of the Suakin contingent. The Treasury, of course, has insisted on this measure in the discharge of its primary duty of securing every penny for the Exchequer at home. Against the discharge of that duty there is not a word to be said, except that the able officials of that Department appear sometimes to have never heard of Carlyle's warning that cash payment is not the only *nexus* between man and man, and do not always bear in mind the proverb that penny-wise is pound-foolish. . . . . India is willing to give help in moderation, but, apart from the question of finance, frequent withdrawals from an Indian army, the strength of which is professedly limited to the strict requirements of India herself, and are not expedient. It is easy to dismiss the withdrawal of 2,500 men as a trifle, but the War Office would not consider the demand for that number as trivial. Lord George Hamilton declines to see any resemblance between the case of Indian troops lent for Imperial purposes and that of British troops lent for Indian purposes, as if it was only in the former case that a connection of interest established an obligation. But, surely, of all our Imperial interests there are few greater than the maintenance of our dominion in India."

A Lame Apology.—*Standard.*

The *Standard*—the official organ of the Government—lamely apologised for the resolution as follows:—"We are confident that, when the heat and tumult which have been raised over the question have subsided, the issue will stand revealed in truer and less exaggerated proportions. As the Chancellor of the Exchequer justly pointed out, the military force which has been sent to Suakin is limited, and the time is limited, and, that being so, no Constitutional wrong can be held to hinge on a case of such narrow scope and application. It is easy for critics who are not disposed to question India's interest in Egypt to raise the cry that Egypt and the Canal were in no danger when the Expedition was entered upon. This is emphatically one of those points that must be left to the discretion of the Government of the day, who are in possession of all the facts, secret and open, connected with so delicate a question as our tenure of Egypt, and who cannot reasonably be expected to make a clean breast of each and every argument for their action."—(*July 7th.*)

"The language of an Attorney."—*Daily News.*

"The Secretary of State for India had to meet as strong a case as was ever raised in Parliament or out of it on behalf of the great dependency which he officially represents. His wisest course would have been to recognise that the weight of argument was against him, and to withdraw with the best grace he could assume from a position he should never have taken up. But as he had determined to stand by his despatch of the 30th of June, on which we have commented already, he should have been prepared to deal exhaustively with the whole subject in a comprehensive and statesmanlike spirit. What he actually did was to express the sentiments of an accountant in the language of an attorney. He urged that the sum involved between the two countries, the rich and the poor, the dominant and the subordinate society, was not more than thirty-five thousand pounds. It is a strange blindness which disables him from seeing that this fact is in truth irrelevant, and that if it were material it would be unfavourable to himself."—(*July 7th.*)

The "Experts" Over-Ruled.—*Manchester Guardian.*

"The opposition to the proposal to charge India with the pay and allowances of the Indian tr[illegible] at Suakin will be strengthened by a piece of informatio[n] which Mr. Curzon gave the House of Commons yesterday [July 3rd]. Out of eleven menbers of the Indian Council in London who voted on the proposal, seven were in its favour and four against it. Thus in London there was a majority of only three in its favour, while at Calcutta it was unanimously condemned by the Viceroy's Council. We are often told that on questions affecting the welfare of the people of India paramount importance should be attached to the opinions of experts in Indian Government. Here is a matter in which, it is well understood, a false step may gravely weaken the attachment of the natives of India to the present form of Goverment, and this is the matter on which Lord Salisbury's Cabinet proposes to overrule the judgment of a considerable aggregate majority of the Anglo-Indian authorities officially consulted at Calcutta and in London."

"The Height of Impolicy."—*Daily Chronicle.*

"What does the Government say in reply? Simply that it is so vastly to the interests of India that we should keep control of the Suez Canal, the short route by which our ships and reinforcements would reach her rapidly in time of need, that she should be glad to lend us her help in consolidating our position in Egypt. That is all. At once half a dozen retorts to this argument spring to mind. It would be for our advantage, as an Empire, that India should be well and promptly defended against any attack upon her borders. Yet we should not fail to charge her every penny for our help all the same. Again, it is to the obvious advantage of our Australian colonies and our far eastern colonies and dependencies, that the Suez Canal should be open to us in time of war, yet we do not ask Australia or the rich merchants of Singapore and Shanghai to contribute to our expedition to smash the Mahdi. Lastly, there is the very simple, but, to our thinking, conclusive argument, that the sum at stake is a mere bagatelle, that India is a very poor country, that Great Britain is a very rich one, and that therefore it is the height of impolicy for the Government in such a matter to offend the universal public opinion in India, to say nothing of a very weighty and general sentiment in this country."

"Not worth While."—*Daily Telegraph.*

"Was it worth while, for the sake of this paltry sum, to override the protest of the Viceroy and his Council, and to create feelings of injury and irritation in India? We cannot think so, and what is more we cannot believe that the English public thinks so either. We feel sure that they would have welcomed a Ministerial decision to deal generously with our great, but none too prosperous, Eastern dependency; and the adoption of the opposite course, for so inadequate a pecuniary advantage, is just one of those pieces of mysteriously 'high statesmanship' which the country either fails to understand or assuredly shows no disposition to appreciate."

Cannot be Seriously Argued.—*Speaker.*

"There has probably never been a parallel case before in the whole history of the House of Commons. The collapse of the

"Imperfect Disinfection is no Disinfection at all."

The Only Reliable Disinfecting Powder

IS

"CALVERT'S,"

Guaranteed to contain 15 per cent. Calvert's No. 5 Carbolic, the strongest disinfectant known.

In 6d., 1/-, and 1/6 Tins; also 7lb and 14lb. Cases, at 2/6 and 4/- each (English Rates).

Cheaper in use than Powders at lower rates, much less being needed. Will not clog pipes or drains.

☞ Avoid Worthless Imitations made with Tar Oils.

Dr. R. M. Gover, in Report to Director-General of Convict Prisons, says: "The preparations of Carbolic Acid supplied by Messrs. Calvert and Co. are, in my opinion, *much superior to those of any other manufacturer.*"

F. C. CALVERT AND CO., MANCHESTER.

defence was, like the withdrawal of the Education Bill, unique. Yet never did a Ministry stand in sorer need of the backing of their friends. Lord George Hamilton is a broken reed. When he got up, things looked bad for the Government. When he sat down, they were hopeless. He thought it smart and clever to ask who killed Hicks Pasha. He might as well have asked who kill Cock Robin. He made what he apparently supposed to be an attack upon Mr. Morley, who was not in Parliament till 1883, and not in office till 1886. The real objects of his aspersions were the Duke of Devonshire, who will not care twopence, and Mr. Chamberlain, who will not forget the incident as long as he lives. Lord George believes, or pretends to believe, that we confer an immense favour upon India by invading the Sudan. That is not the opinion of a single native Indian, nor of one member of the Indian Government. It cannot be seriously argued, except on the hypothesis that an Imperial interest must always be an Indian one. But Lord George himself discarded that view when he rightly insisted that the whole cost of the Indian contingent at Mombasa should be borne by the Treasury."

"The Curse of Madness."—*Saturday Review.*

"Has the curse of madness literally descended upon the Government? The thought is treason. But how account otherwise for conduct which, after repeated warnings from the unanimous Press of the party, and no indistinct menaces from staunch supporters, drives twenty-three Unionists into the Opposition Lobby for the sake of £35,000? It is the pat phrase of the thick-and-thin Government-man that it is only the young and inexperienced members returned at the last election who, in their ignorance, turn against their political pastors and masters. A glance at the division-list of Monday will dispel this illusion. With the exception of Mr. Bhownaggree, whose vote is entitled to special weight, Mr. Fison, and Mr. Moon—we do not include Sir Lewis M'Iver, because he sat in the short Parliament elected in 1895—none of the protestants are new members. Sir Andrew Scoble, it is true, was only returned in 1892; but he has filled the high office of Legal Member of the Governor-General of India's Council, and his vote, like Mr. Bhownaggree's, has a special value derived from personal experience. All the other Unionists who voted with Mr. Morley are men of mature political judgment, and most of them are ordinarily loyal friends of the Government. . . . . No: the theory that the critics of the Government are merely the raw boys who floated in at the last election will not do. There is hardly a name in the list of twenty-three that will not carry weight with some section of the public. In fact, it is a very remarkable protest, made by some of the ablest members of the Unionist party."

A "Cheeseparing Policy."—*St. James's Gazette.*

Commenting on July 17th on the vote in the House of Lords, the *St. James's Gazette* wrote in an article headed "A Lost Opportunity":—"The arguments of the supporters of the resolution yield a plentiful crop of reasons for the view that the policy of the Government, in extorting this payment from India, is indefensible. The contention that India is so vitally interested in destroying the rule of the Khalifa, that she may be called upon with justice to pay for troops she lends us for service at Suakin, is an ingenious invention that comes from the Treasury. India is, of course, affected by the safety of the Red Sea, which is geographically and politically a continuation of the Suez Canal; but she is as little affected by what goes on in the heart of the African continent as in the planet Mars. It is not the fact that the war in the Sudan is an Indian war. It is an Egyptian war, and, being Egyptian, a British war, to be fought and paid for by Egypt, or if she prove unequal to the task, by ourselves. The expedition is part of a great Imperial plan, the fruits of which will be reaped by Great Britain rather than by India. The Cabinet should have protected the financial interests of India, regarding itself as an Imperial Cabinet and not as a body to carry out and defend the cheeseparing policy of the officials of the British Treasury."

"The Revolt of the British Conscience."—*Scotsman.*

"The British public are beginning to realise that we have always treated India somewhat ungenerously in connection with these military expeditions, and that, on the plea that it is India's interest to help in keeping open and secure the road to India, charges have been thrown upon the Indian Exchequer which this country ought in fairness to have borne. This is no new thing. It is as old as our possession of an Empire in the East. The new thing is the revolt of the British conscience against forcing India to pay for enterprises in the undertaking of which its Government and people have not only no voice, but a very slight or altogether questionable interest. It is a remarkable fact that in all the cases referred to as precedents for the present charge the British Viceroy and his British Councillors have been unanimous and earnest in their opposition to the demands made upon them by the Home Government, and that British public opinion in India, as well as native opinion, has been very strong on the same side. It is sometimes said that there is no such thing as native public opinion in India, and the statement may be true as regards the great mass of the population. But there is now a large and continually increasing body of educated natives who read newspapers and discuss politics and criticise the conduct of their British rulers and the treatment of India by the British Government."

"Making the Spectators Howl."—*Westminster Gazette.*

"The point of principle, then, seems to be on the side of India, which has every reason to resist a most dangerous precedent. Other Governments, it is true, have strained the point against her, but they have always done it with an uncomfortable conscience, and, when pressed, have vowed that it should be positively the last time. But if the British case were as strong as it is weak, we should still say that the thing ought only to be done after the gravest deliberation. . . . . Faced with the fact that the Viceroy's Council in India is unanimously against us, we proceed to justify ourselves by the same kind of casuistry as, say, the partisans of Cambridge employ to justify the wides and no-balls which saved the follow-on last Friday. The analogy is really not a bad one. A Government, like a cricket team, cannot afford to do things which make the spectaters howl. And, seriously, is it not time that we closed the subscription list for the limited liability expedition and paid up the deficit like men?"

Limits of space prevent us from quoting further. But we may add that leading articles condemning the Government's policy have also appeared in the following journals:—

Birmingham Daily Post, Pall Mall Gazette, National Observer, Observer, Guardian, Daily Graphic, Star, Leicester Daily Post, Glasgow Herald, Bradford Observer, Western Mercury, Eastern Morning News, African Review, Nottingham Daily Express, Grimsby News, Court Circular, Midland Counties Express, Yorkshire Herald, Glasgow Daily Record, Manchester Evening News, Aberdeen Free Press, Edinburgh Evening Dispatch, Newcastle Daily Leader, North British Daily Mail, Northern Daily Telegraph, Bury Times, Leeds Mercury, Bristol Mercury, Manchester Courier, Glasgow Evening Times, Oldham Chronicle, Liverpool Daily Post, Eastern Daily Press, Western Press (Bristol), *Sheffield Independent, Western Mail* (Cardiff), *South Wales Daily News*, and many others.

CELEBRATED ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF TULSIKRIT RAMAYAN. By Mr. F. S. Growse, M.A., C.I.E. Complete in 3 volumes. Fifth Edition. Highly spoken of both by English and Native Press. Also Second-hand books on sale. Price Rs. 3-6 by V.P. Post in India, and 4s. 6d. in England. Apply to Babu Harprasad, Municipal Commissioner, Fatehgarh, N.W.P., India.

Printed by A. Bonner, 1 & 2, Took's Court, E.C., and Published for the Proprietors (the Indian National Congress), at 84 and 85, Palace Chambers, London, S.W.